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1. Introduction 
1.1. Statement of the problem  
Standards have a substantial impact in the society nowadays. Their beneficial effects in 
increasing consumer choice have been recognised especially in markets with strong network 
connections such as Information and Communications Technologies (“ICT”). Yet, despite 
those benefits, standards are prone to have harmful effects on competition. This is particularly 
so within the field where standards are based on patent-protected technology such as ICT. 
Once a patent-protected technology has been implemented into a standard and the standard 
has been adopted by a standard setting organization (“SSO”), the owner of the patent essential 
for the standard (“SEP”) becomes an unavoidable trading partner for the manufactures of the 
standard-compliant goods.1 In that regard, the competition authorities turned their attention 
towards the threat of use of injunctive reliefs by SEP owners, who are dominant undertakings, 
in order to succeed with anticompetitive demands which manufacturers would not have 
accepted before the standard was adopted.  
Since rules on enforcement of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) are only partly 
harmonised in the EU,2 national courts have developed different approaches towards the issue 
of use of injunctive reliefs in SEPs disputes regarding their potential anti-competitive effect. 
The European Commission (“Commission”) expressed its view in the enforcement decisions 
against Motorola Mobility (“Motorola”)3 and Samsung Electronics (“Samsung”).4 The 
position previously taken by national courts is not entirely in line with the position adopted by 
the Commission in these particular decisions. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) has only recently been asked to adopt its stance on the matter5 and to implement 
uniform approach across the Union. The reference for preliminary ruling in Huawei v ZTE 
shows that there are conflicting legal views which need to be resolved. The current state of 
affairs creates uncertainty for both SEP owners and SEP implementers as to the lawfulness of 
their conduct.6  
1.2. Research question 
“What are the conditions under which a SEP owner, who has given commitment to license his 
patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms, can be found abusing 
his dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
                                                 
1 Petrovčič, U., “Competition Law and Standard Essential Patents: A Transatlantic Perspective”, Kluwer Law 
International, 2014, p. 2 – 3  
2 Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L 157 (“Enforcement Directive”) 
3 Case AT.39985 Motorola Mobility – Enforcement of GPRS standard essential patents, C(2014) 2892 [2014] 
(“Motorola Mobility”) 
4 Case AT.39939 Samsung Electronics – Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents, C(2014) 2891 [2014] 
(“Samsung Electronics”) 
5 CJEU, Request for preliminary ruling, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH., 
Case C-170/13, lodged on 5 April 2013. OJ C 215, 27 July 2013 (“Huawei v ZTE”) 
6 C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, Opinion of AG Wathelet, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391 (“AG Wathelet opinion”), para. 7 
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Union (“TFEU”) by seeking or threatening to seek an injunctive relief against an unlicensed 
manufacturer of the standard-compliant goods?”7 
1.3. Aims and objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the different legal tests and approaches which the national 
courts, the Commission and the CJEU apply in order to assess whether owners of SEPs, who 
have committed themselves to grant licenses to their patents on FRAND terms, abused their 
dominant position under Article 102 TFEU by seeking or threatening to seek injunctive reliefs 
against unlicensed manufacturers of the standard-compliant goods. The analysis will be done 
within the broader context of interplay between patent rights and competition law in the 
European Union and with the view to strike a right balance between the interests at stake.  
1.4. Delimitation 
The views presented in this work are based on assumptions that the patents are valid and 
essential and that the owners of SEPs posses significant market power which leads to 
dominant position for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU. The thesis does not challenge the 
view that patents provide incentives to innovate.  
The thesis does not address the potentially deceptive behaviour of SEP owners during 
the standardization process itself (e.g. ex ante standardisation). Its focus is on SEP owners’ 
behaviour within the licensing practises after a standard has been adopted (e.g. ex post 
standardisation). Patent assertion entities, non-practicing entities, or as commonly referred to 
as patent-trolls, which use patents only in order to generate incomes and which are immune to 
countersuits and injunctions,8 are mentioned only briefly when discussing the stance on the 
use of injunctions in the U.S. 
The thesis does not aim to cover all range of remedies available to SEP owners. The 
focus is on remedies available under patent law. The thesis does not discuss remedies 
available under other bodies of law, such as contract law and equity. 
1.5. Research methodology 
This thesis will apply the traditional legal doctrinal research method. In order to offer a 
critique of the current state of law, it is inevitable to identify the content and to assess the 
authority of the legal system under scrutiny and the doctrinal research method serves to 
achieve this objective.9 Furthermore, the thesis will to a certain extent, where considered 
appropriate by the author, apply the comparative method. 
Valid legal norms of patent law and European competition law will be briefly 
introduced. Substantial part of the thesis will describe and analyse case law of the CJEU. This 
will be done together with references to opposing legal writings in order to put the different 
views into perspective and in order to provide rationale behind the author’s opinions.  
                                                 
7 The research question was inspired by the first question referred in the Huawei v ZTE case 
8 Lim, D., “Standard Essential Patents, Trolls and Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game”, 119 (1) Penn 
State Law Review, 2014, p. 19. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495547> accessed 28 
April 2015 
9 Hutchinson, T., “Doctrinal Research” in Watkins, D., Burton, M., “Research methods in law”, Routledge : 
2013. p. 7 – 8 
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 When discussing the use of injunctions within the broader context of enforcement of 
IPRs, the author considers references to the U.S. doctrine as appropriate in order to enhance 
the analysis of the European regime. Since the U.S. constitutes a forum where most patent 
infringement proceedings are being tried,10 the U.S. legal scholarship is more developed 
within this area of law. In particular, the underlying issue of patent hold-up has been first 
introduced there. 
The various tests adopted by the CJEU in its case law on IPRs and abuse of dominant 
position under Article 102 TFEU will be compared with the tests applied by national courts in 
Germany and the Netherlands in SEP disputes, with the views expressed by the European 
Commission in its enforcement decisions against Motorola and Samsung, with the view 
expressed by Advocate General (“AG”) Wathelet in his opinion in Huawei v ZTE and with the 
CJEU’s judgment in that case. Germany and the Netherlands were selected since both 
Member States represent the most frequent fora for patent infringement disputes in Europe.11 
Moreover, the reference for preliminary ruling in Huawei v ZTE was submitted by a German 
court and all five questions posed seem to rely on the Orange-Book-Standard framework as 
adopted by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany. As will be seen, the approach taken by 
the Dutch courts, on the other hand, is more similar to the one articulated by the Commission 
in Motorola and Samsung.12 The content of the judgments of the national courts in Germany 
and the Netherlands will be accessed through references in legal scholarly articles.  
Since the judgment of the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE only came out on 16 July 2015, 
there were not any academic writings relating to this specific judgment available at the time of 
writing of this thesis. However, in order to keep up with the development within the field of 
SEPs and abuse of dominant position and to enhance further discussion, the author considered 
inclusion of the description and analysis of the Court’s approach to be vital. Apart from the 
judgment itself, the relevant part of the text is based on comments expressed by legal scholars 
that were available as of August 2015.   
1.6. Outline 
The thesis is divided into 6 main chapters. In order to establish the scope of the thesis and to 
provide understanding of future analysis, Chapter 2 discusses the context of ICT industry, 
standardisation and FRAND commitments. The focus is on competition law concerns arising 
in situations where standards are based on patent-protected technology. Chapter 3 describes 
the European approach to exercise of IPRs which sets out that IPRs can only be encroached 
upon on the basis of competition law under exceptional circumstances. Chapter 4 addresses 
enforcement of IPRs. The focus is on remedies provided for by patent law, namely on the use 
of injunctive reliefs and their interplay with EU competition law. The chapter considers 
approaches both in the EU, within its specifics, and in the US where, despite the difference in 
                                                 
10 Zografos, A. S., “The SEP Holder’s Guide to the Antitrust Galaxy: FRAND and Injunctions”, 
37 (1) World Competition Law and Economic Review, 2014. Kluwer Law International, p. 66 
11 Larouche, P., and Zingales, N., “Injunctive Relief in Disputes Related to Standard-Essential Patents: Time for 
the CJEU to Set Fair and Reasonable Presumptions” (2014) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2014-048, p. 13 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536829> accessed 10 April 2015 
12 Telyas, D., “The Interface between Competition Law, Patents and Technical Standards”, Kluwer Law 
International, 2014, p. 215 
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case law being framed within patent law and unfair competition context, the doctrine has been 
far more developed, thus providing explanation of the issues in more detailed way. Chapter 5 
represents the core of this thesis. It describes and analyses the competition law approach to 
seeking injunctions in SEPs infringement proceedings as adopted by the selected national 
courts in the EU, the Commission, the Advocate General and the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE. The 
particular approaches are further assessed within the critique expressed by legal scholarship. 
Chapter 6 provides a final comparison of the approaches within the context of interplay 
between competition law and rights of the patent owners and with the view of striking a fair 
balance between the interests at issue.   
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2. Setting the context  
2.1. The dynamics of the ICT industry 
Historically, there has been very little litigation in the mobile telephony industry. The 
traditional players were both holders and implementers of SEPs, thus having an interest in 
setting royalty rates that were actually reasonable for both sides. Cross-licensing has acted as 
a safeguard against imposition of onerous licensing terms. However, following the entry of 
new manufacturers such as Apple, Google and Microsoft, at the turn of the 21st century, the 
dynamics of the market have changed. Since neither of the new players were 
telecommunications undertakings, they did not have access to patents essential to the global 
standards, and therefore could not enter into cross-licensing agreements as the old 
manufacturers have traditionally done.13 Moreover, the smartphone revolution disrupted the 
technology market equilibrium and has caused an evolution in SEPs licensing practices.14  
Soon, the older players’ position in the market begun to decline and some of them 
even had to exit the manufacturing business and sell off their patent portfolios which were 
mostly acquired by their new rivals. The acquisition by Apple, Microsoft and other members 
of the Rockstar consortium of Nortel’s 6 000 patents, many of which covered core wireless 
network technologies such as LTE and 3G, for 4.5 billion US dollars was described as “the 
largest intellectual property portfolio ever sold”.15 However, this was surpassed only a year 
later with Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility Inc. and its 17 000 patents worth 12.5 
billion US dollars.16  
The risk of disputes between SEP holders and SEP implementers has increased 
following the growth of economic importance of standards in the ICT sector.17 The 
developments have substantially contributed to shifts in bargaining powers between the 
traditional and new players and have spurred litigations worldwide, unfolding issues of 
contract, patent and competition law.18 Only Samsung and Apple, one of the industry’s 
biggest players had filed suits against each other in 10 countries around the world.19 It is not, 
however, only patent implementers raising the issue of abuse of a dominant position as 
counterclaim in patent infringement suits, as competitors, they also lodge complaints with 
competition agencies.20 The older players, owners of SEPs, obviously advocate stronger 
                                                 
13 Harkrider, J. D., “Seeing the Forest through the SEPs”, 27 (3) Antitrust, Summer 2013, p. 23 – 25  
<http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/seeing_the_forest_through_seps-harkrider.pdf> accessed 15 April 
2015 
14 Lim, op. cit., p. 9 – 15  
15 Brickley, P., “Nortel $4.5-Billion Patent Sale to Apple, Microsoft, Others Approved”, Wall Street Journal, 11 
July 2011. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812104576440161959082234> accessed 27 
March 2015 
16 Lim, op. cit., p. 16 
17 Telyas, op. cit., p. 12 
18 Jones, A., “Standard-essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the Smartphone Wars”, 10(1) 
European Competition Journal, 2014, p. 9 
19 Mueller, F., “List of 50+ Apple-Samsung lawsuits in 10 countries”, Foss Patents, 28 April 2012,  
<www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/list-of-50-apple-samsung-lawsuits-in-10.html> accessed 5 April 2015 
20 Petit, N., “Injunctions for FRAND-pledged SEPs: The Quest for an Appropriate Test of Abuse under Article 
102 TFEU” (2013), p. 1 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2371192> accessed 10 April 2015 
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protection being given to SEPs, while the new entrants argue for more intervention on the 
basis of competition law, with less protection being given to SEPs.21 
2.2. Standardisation and potential anti-competitive effects 
Besides telecommunications, smartphones integrate number of other functions, such as 
computing, video and photographic, which are all potentially covered by numerous relevant 
patents that are generally held by various market players, with an estimated number of 
250 000 patents in a single smartphone. In order for the various functions and networks to 
communicate, standardisation is required.22 Indeed, standards in the ICT industry have 
facilitated development and adoption of new generations of mobile technologies23 and 
according to some, “without standardisation, there would not be a modern economy.”24  
The general public profits from voluntary adoption of standards in number of ways. 
Interoperability of devices leads to efficient allocation of resources.25 The more users adopt 
the technology, the greater is the decrease in costs of the technology manufacturers, enabling 
them to create economies of scale.26 Interoperability also gives consumers wider choice, 
allowing them to use products from different manufacturers, thus contributing to greater 
network effects. It follows that the more manufactures adopt innovations in the ICT industry, 
the more effective the innovations become. Standardisation is used precisely for that purpose, 
as a tool to facilitate widespread adoption of inventions.27 Adoption of standards is also in the 
interest of manufacturers since it enables them to expand their business globally.28 Moreover, 
by reducing differentiation between products, standardisation serves as a means of supporting 
price competition. Standards also play an important role in promoting trade among states and 
in particular, in the EU context, they are a useful tool in helping to achieve the creation of a 
single market.29 The Commission has thus encouraged standardisation in order to achieve 
overall greater competitiveness in Europe.30  
The Commission’s document “Strategic visions for European standards” provides that 
standards are “documents that define technical or quality requirements with which current or 
                                                 
21 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 36 
22 Lim, op. cit., p. 20 
23 As described by Harkrider: “Many of the most significant accomplishments in the telecommunications field 
are attributable to the work of major SSOs, such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, which 
promulgated the GSM, 3G, and 4G standards.” See Harkrider, op. cit., p. 23 
24 Surowiecki, J. “Turn of the Century”, Wired, January  2002  
<http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/10.01/standards.html> accessed 11 April 2015  
25 Policy statement on remedies for standards-essential patents subject to voluntary F/RAND commitments, 
United States Department of Justice and United States Patent & Trademark Office, January 8, 2013. p. 3. < 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJ-PTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-8-13.pdf> 
accessed 7 April 2015 
26 Reducing cost of production per unit 
27 Kesan, J., P., Hayes, C., M., “FRANDs Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments”, 
89 Indiana Law Journal, 2014, p. 237 
28 Lundqvist, B., “Competition Law as the Limit to Standard-Setting”, (August 16, 2014). Forthcoming, Drexl, 
J., Di Porto, F., (ed) ‘Competition Law as Regulation’, Edward Elgar, 2015. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551026> accessed 5 August 2015 (“Lundqvist 2014”) 
29 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 26 
30 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, Towards an increased contribution from standardisation to innovation in Europe, 
COM(2008) 133 final 
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future products, production processes, services or methods may comply.”31 Standards 
incorporate number of technologies which are usually protected by patents. Patents which are 
essential to a standard, meaning that the standard cannot be implemented without obtaining a 
license on the patent-protected technology, are commonly referred to as standard essential 
patents.32 Article 15.6 of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute’s (“ETSI”) 
IPR Policy provides that IPRs are considered essential where it is not possible on technical 
grounds to manufacture a standard-compliant product without infringing the IPR. However, 
SSOs, including ETSI, do not check whether a patent that has been declared as essential is 
actually essential or valid.33  
Two distinct functions of standards can be identified. Standards either serve as 
guarantees of a quality or safety of a product or as instruments that enable network 
interoperability. It is the latter which is of importance within the field of the ICT industry. 
Even though standards can arise from the market, or may be adopted by public authorities, for 
instance for health and safety reasons, standards in the ICT field are generally developed 
within the private sphere of SSOs. These are organisations that serve as a platform for 
interested stakeholders to meet, discuss and adopt future standards.34 Since most of the SSOs 
members are both SEP holders and SEP implementers,35 SSOs tend to remain neutral should a 
dispute arise between their members.36  
Although standards adopted within SSOs are not legally binding,37 ICT as a network 
dependent industry de facto requires manufacturers to comply with the industry standards.38 
In fact, markets driven by network effects tend to tip towards one technological solution even 
without an agreement on de jure standard reached within a SSO.39 The reason for that is that 
such markets are actually facilitated, if not created, by adoption of interoperability 
standards.40 In any event, the rationale for supporting de jure adoptions of standards even in 
network dependent industries is that those standards are usually based on technologies 
developed by several undertakings and represent a solution chosen by all stakeholders. In 
Lundqvist’s words, this kind of situation represents at the same time “collective innovation” 
and “collective competition.”41  
                                                 
31 European Commission, “A Strategic Vision for European Standards: Moving Forward to Enhance and 
Accelerate the Sustainable Growth of the European Economy by 2020”, Brussels, 1. 6. 2011, COM (2011) 311, 
at 1.1. 
32 Rato, M., English, M., “IP and Antitrust: Recent Developments in EU Law” in Alves Guimarães, D., 
Noormohamed, R., et al. (eds), “Communications and Competition Law: Key Issues in the Telecoms, Media and 
Technology Sectors,” 25 International Bar Association Series, Kluwer Law International, 2015, p. 194 
33 AG Wathelet opinion, para. 24 
34 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 20 – 21  
35 Harkrider, op. cit., p. 24  
36 Lim, op. cit., p. 10 
37 There are exceptions though. In France for instance, SSOs have a status of public bodies, and the standards 
that they adopt are considered as administrative acts, thus requiring mandatory compliance from all market 
players. See Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 21 – 22  
38 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 24 et seq. 
39 Lundqvist 2014, op. cit., p. 2 – 3  
40 Ibid., p. 7 
41 Ibid., p. 10 
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The Commission has recognised that the rules of SSOs play an important role in 
ensuring pro-competitive effects of the standardisation process. To encourage adoption of 
procedural safeguards in order to avoid practices which could harm competition, the 
Commission adopted Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements (2001), which were revised in 2011. The 2001 Guidelines provided 
that agreements which conform to specific requirements of being adopted through unrestricted 
and transparent procedure do not fall under the prohibition contained in Article 101 TFEU. 
Such requirements were aimed to ensure that the procedure of adoption of a standard would 
be open to all interested undertakings. With the view of preventing market foreclosures, the 
2001 Guidelines also contained a requirement that open access to the adopted standard will be 
given to all third parties. This objective was later clarified in the 2011 Guidelines which 
provide that an open access to the standard should be safeguarded through irrevocable 
commitment of the participants to the standardisation process to make their technologies 
available under FRAND terms. Compliance with the suggestions contained in the Guidelines 
serves as a “safe harbour” for the SSOs. Non-compliance, on the other hand, does not mean 
that the agreements restrict competition. It only means that the effects of the agreements on 
competition will be evaluated on a case by case basis.42  
The Commission has also been supportive of SSOs allowing the participants in the 
standardisation process to make an ex ante declaration of licensing terms. The 2011 
Guidelines provide that IPR owners are allowed to reveal the maximum level of royalties that 
that they would charge for the implementation of their SEPs.43 This policy although 
implemented by various SSOs including ETSI, which produces globally applicable standards 
within the field of ICT,44  has however, met with resistance. In practise, it is difficult to make 
an ex ante declaration of licensing conditions since these are dependent on factors which are 
usually unknown at the time when adoption of standards are discussed. Licensing terms are 
rather dependent on business strategies of the parties.45 
Despite having substantial benefits, concerns have been expressed about the potential 
anti-competitive effects of standardisation on the competition process and consumer welfare 
especially where standards incorporate technologies protected by patents.46 The bigger the 
market success of a standard, the greater anti-competitive concern can be identified.47 It has to 
be pointed up that success of a standard is in the interest of both SEP owners and SEP 
implementers since it enables to enlarge customer base for both.48 In any event, anti-
competitive concerns are greater where compliance with the standard is a de facto 
                                                 
42 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 163 – 165 
43 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements of 14 January 2011 [2011] OJ C11/01, 
para. 299 
44 European Telecommunications Standards Institute <http://www.etsi.org/about> accessed 18 April 2015  
45 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 173 – 175  
46 de la Mano, M., Nazzini, R. and Zenger H., “Article 102 – Specific Abusive Practices in Relation to IPR 
Rights”, in Faull, J., & Nikpay, A., The EU Law of Competition, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 499 
47 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 24 
48 Lim, op. cit., p. 10 – 11  
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requirement for market participation such as in the ICT industry, where interoperability of a 
product is fundamental,49 and where costs for switching technology are high.50 
The debate is mainly centred on unilateral conduct of SEP owners. After a patent-
protected technology has been implemented into a standard, it is not possible, on technical 
grounds, to comply with the standard without infringing the patent. The use of the patent thus 
becomes essential for all manufacturers of the standard-compliant goods, creating a 
bottleneck in a way that the holder of the standard controls access to the market. The concern 
from competition law perspective lies within the ownership of SEPs which may increase the 
SEP owner’s bargaining power and lead to a potential opportunistic behaviour with various 
negative effects.51 The fear is that the owner of the SEP might take an advantage of the 
position that he has acquired by incorporation of his patent-protected technology into a 
standard and may refuse to license his patents or demand onerous licensing terms, thus 
holding-up the progress of the innovative technology.52  
A patent hold-up53 occurs where the SEP implementer has already made substantial 
investments in order to comply with the standard54 and subsequently is faced with excessive 
demands from the SEP owner.55 Patent hold-up may increase costs of technology for 
consumers and cause significant inefficiencies within the standardisation process. It is 
especially of threat where product components are covered by numerous patents such as in the 
smartphone industry.56 Petrovčič identifies three types of strategic licensing practices which 
lead to creation of the hold-up situation. By refusing to license, the SEP holder may 
potentially exclude others from participating on the relevant product market. Ability to extract 
excessive licensing fees represents exploitative effect of the SEP holder’s behaviour.57 
Moreover, the SEPs holder’s behaviour may also have negative effects on his competitors’ 
ability to compete in a secondary market.58 With these considerations in mind, a balanced 
approach must be set in order to ensure effective protection of patented technology, which 
would at the same time secure proper functioning of the competition process with the ultimate 
goal of protecting the consumers.59 
                                                 
49 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 24 – 25  
50 Jones, op. cit., p. 4 
51 de la Mano, “Article 102 – Specific Abusive Practices in Relation to IPR Rights”, op. cit., p. 499 
52 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 3 – 4  
53 The first type of a hold-up, which is commonly referred to as a patent ambush, in a situation where the patent 
owner might ignore rules of SSOs and intentionally not disclose that he possesses patens essential for adoption 
of a standard and later claim their relevance, is not dealt with in this thesis since it focuses on post 
standardisation behaviour.  
54 The investment is represented by sunk costs incurred in order to enable the implementer to use the patented 
technology. See Shapiro, “Injunctions, Hold-up and Patent Royalties”, 12 (2) American Law and Economics 
Review 2010, (“Shapiro 2010”), p. 284  
55 Gabathuler, D., Martinez Rivero, E., “Communications (Telecoms and Internet) – Other Developments”  in 
Faull, J., & Nikpay, A., The EU Law of Competition, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 1706 
56 Kesan, op. cit., p. 238  
57 Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 30 
58 These cases have been rarely addressed in practise to date. The reason for that is probably that the past cases 
usually concerned SEP owners not active in the downstream market. See Petrovčič, op. cit., p. 127 et seq. where 
she discusses practises that could harm the rival’s ability to compete under the margin squeeze doctrine.     
59 Kesan, op. cit., p. 238 
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The hold-up theory in patent law was first applied in legal scholarship by Carl Shapiro 
in 2001,60 and later advocated by several other authors, even though there is no empirical 
evidence supporting this view. As has been noted, “if hold-up were prevalent in the industry, 
one would expect to see the profits of SEP holders significantly outstrip those of SEP 
implementers. Yet, the opposite is true.”61 This is illustrated by Apple gaining 80% of its 
profits in smartphones despite having only few network protocol SEPs, and the traditional 
holders of SEPs such as Nortel going bankrupt and several others such as Nokia and Motorola 
Mobility suffering from substantial drops in profit.62 Furthermore, the fear of the potential 
threat of refusal to license a SEP seems to go against the rationale of standardisation where 
the widespread adoption of the technology is in the interest of both SEP owners and SEP 
implementers. For all these reasons, the hold-up theory has been criticised by numerous 
scholars, creating a significant point of departure in both legal and economic literature.63 
Nonetheless, the risk of hold-up remains to be a valid concern for policy makers. So 
does, however, the opposite phenomenon, which is referred to as hold-out or reverse hold-up. 
Reverse hold-up represents a situation where licensees refuse to pay for the implementation of 
SEPs, delay negotiations or propose rates below the value of the patent-protected technology 
and without there being any risk of facing injunctions or damages, the SEP owner would have 
to accept. In this kind of situation, the SEP owner would be held up by the prospective 
licensee.64 It is clear that complete elimination of injunctions as even potential remedies 
would enhance the risk of reverse hold-up and would lead to underinvestment in innovation 
since SEP owners would face the risk of not being able to recoup their past investments. The 
risk of reverse hold-up is all the more imminent considering the current system. While the 
SEP holder has an obligation pursuant to the FRAND commitment to negotiate reasonable 
and non-discriminatory licensing terms, there is no such obligation imposed on SEP 
implementers and the only way for SEP holders to receive appropriate compensation or to 
force the implementers to take a license for the SEP is to pursue infringement proceedings.65 
The SEP implementers are “always better off holding out instead of negotiating a FRAND 
license,” since infringement proceedings may last up to several years of litigation and the 
worst penalty the implementers could face would be to “pay some fraction of the FRAND 
royalty” for the infringement.66 In accordance with these valid considerations, SSOs, 
including ETSI, do not prohibit SEP owners from seeking injunctions as potential remedies.67 
Recent empirical study about litigation in the ICT industry, which was conducted in 
the U.S., shows that it is not SEPs that are the forefront of the smartphone wars. The litigation 
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battles between the industry’s major players are rather concerned with patents not related to 
standards. The study shows that less than one third of the patents involved in the smartphone 
war litigation are related to standards and that no injunction was actually granted for a SEP.68 
However, as Lim notes, between 65 and 90% of all patent cases get settled outside of 
courtrooms. Therefore, “the data from the study may grossly underestimate the severity of the 
problem as defendants negotiate their settlements under the threat of patent hold-ups.”69  
2.3. Patent rights and competition law intervention 
Patent right represents a negative statutory right, allowing a patent owner to exclude others 
from commercially exploiting the patent without the owner’s consent for a specified period of 
time, normally 20 years from the date of filing for patent application.70 It covers the right to 
exclude others from using the protected technology and the right to set the terms and 
conditions of commercial use, as well as the right to oppose infringements.71 The inventor is 
given legal monopoly to recoup his investments either by reserving the use of patent-protected 
technology for himself or by licensing the patent to others or by the combination of the two.72 
Discrimination is, to a certain extent, inherent in the right, since the patent owner can 
basically dictate conditions for licensing and freely determine the licensees. The rationale for 
granting exclusive patent rights is to promote innovation by offering statutory protection for 
technological inventions and “by allowing for the exclusion of unlicensed ‘free riders’.”73 
Without the protection, technological inventions could be replicated at low costs by other 
market participants, leaving the inventors without possibility to recoup their past investments, 
which, in the long run, would be detrimental to innovation and consumer welfare. Even 
though it does not come without costs in a way that the patent owner might be able to charge 
monopoly price for a certain period of time or that the patent may act as a barrier to entry the 
market, it is generally believed that those are outweighed by the benefits and that patent rights 
serve as a useful tool to stimulate innovation.74 
 Innovation in modern industries such as the ICT is to a large extent based on earlier 
inventions. Shapiro refers to this phenomenon of one invention being built upon an earlier 
invention which in turn was built upon even earlier inventions and which might actually rely 
on technologies that are still protected by patents, as “standing on top of a huge pyramid.”75 
Shapiro recognises that the current patent system creates a “web overlapping intellectual 
property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to commercialize new 
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technology.”76 Thus, it appears that in industries with cumulative inventions, IPRs can in fact 
hold back further innovation.77  
It has been recognized that patent law and competition law seek the same objective, to 
maximise “allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency,”78 or in other words, to promote 
innovation and enhance consumer welfare. Competition law aims to facilitate both static and 
dynamic competition, by stimulating competitors to offer their best products and thus keeping 
the market competitive. Patent law promotes dynamic competition, encouraging competition 
by substitution.79 The patent law system is efficient both in short term and in long term. In 
short term, even though products are supplied at higher price, consumers get better choice. In 
long term, it is the whole society who benefits since after the expiration of the patent, the 
industry is able to produce more and at lower costs.80 In the words of the former DG Comp 
Commissioner Almunia, “the protection of intellectual property is a cornerstone of 
innovation and growth. But so is competition.”81 
However, since the bodies of law use different tools for achieving the objective, a 
conflict can arise, and even a legitimately obtained patent right, in particular an exercise of the 
patent right to be precise, may trigger competition law concerns.82 Concerns have been raised 
regarding “the expansion of the domains of patentability, and the gradual loosening of 
standards for granting patents” in a way that could lead to exploitation of the patent system 
and the use of patents for strategic purposes, blocking competitors and deterring innovation.83 
Of competition law concern is especially use of patents by undertakings that are dominant on 
the market.84  
Lim argues that despite playing a complementary role, competition law is more suited 
for handling the anti-competitive conduct before a standard is set, whereas patent law is better 
used for resolving the disputes afterwards.85 He explains that it is not a role of competition 
law to control SSOs policies or to solve contractual disputes between the parties on what 
constitutes FRAND terms and what not. The view of less intervention on competition law 
grounds represents the approach in the U.S., where the Antitrust Division of the Justice 
Department advocates IP policy approach which would encourage the parties at dispute to 
settle rather than for them to have recourse to injunctions.86  
In the EU, intervention on competition law grounds has two goals – economic and 
political.87 The aim of achieving economic efficiency is based on the ordoliberal school of 
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thought which is centred on the premise that competition fosters economic progress.88 The EU 
approach is further based on the premise that competitive market promotes innovation.89 This 
belief is based on the economics of Arrow who holds that an undertaking in a competitive 
environment has a higher motivation to reduce the price of its product than a monopolist.90 
Nonetheless, Article 102 TFEU also relates to the broader political goal of establishing 
common market in Europe, the rationale being that private undertakings should not be able to 
re-build barriers that were taken down between Member States.91 In that connection, it has to 
be emphasized that even though in theory it might be preferable to address problems raised by 
SEPs through contract law or patent law, these policies may not be best suited for use within 
the specific European legal environment.92 The main arguments for invoking EU competition 
law for addressing the concerns raised by SEPs relates to the fact that the patent law system 
differs in the Member States, as there is no single EU regulator, and the lack of harmonisation 
provides only for limited number of remedies.93 Thus, in broader perspective, the rationale 
behind competition law intervention in the EU is to cure the failures identified above.  
Overall, one more reason for addressing the opportunistic conduct of SEP owners 
through competition law can be identified. Competition law protects the interest of 
consumers, whereas patent law and contract law only protect the interests of individual 
licensees.94  
2.4. FRAND commitments 
Since a SEP owner would normally have, as any other owner of a patent, statutory right to 
exclude others from using his patent, thus making the standard inaccessible, the participants in 
the standardisation process, who hold SEPs,95 are generally required to declare that they are 
willing to license their patents on FRAND terms.96 In the Commission’s words, FRAND 
terms should, in an ideal scenario, represent the final result of licensing negotiations.97 The 
commitment to license on FRAND terms is given prior to the adoption of the standard.98 
FRAND is a commitment of a patent owner not to exercise full scope of his rights. The 
incentive for the patent owner is that the commitment is given in exchange for adoption of his 
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patent-protected technology into a standard which is supposed to broaden his licensing 
opportunities.99 In the context of the ICT industry, SEP holders are required to issue an 
irrevocable commitment in writing to grant licenses to all third parties on FRAND terms 
pursuant to Article 6.1 of the ETSI IPR policy, a document which was adopted in accordance 
with the Commission’s 2011 Horizontal Guidelines.100  
FRAND commitment aims to ensure that an effective access to the standard will be 
given.101 It does not, however, mean that the SEP owner is required to give unconditional 
access to the technology incorporated in the standard. The SEP owner is obliged to license 
only as long as the negotiated licensing terms are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.102  
It is important to note that the value of standards only grows with implementation. 
FRAND commitment seeks to strike a balance between the interests of SEP owners by 
ensuring an appropriate remuneration for making their technological inventions available to 
others, and the interests of SEP implementers by securing the competitive conditions that 
existed on the market before the technology was adopted into the standard.103 The ultimate 
objective is that SEP owners, SEP implementers and end consumers all benefit from the 
success of the standard.104 It is a preventive measure which serves to ensure that the market is 
not locked-in105 and that SEP owners will not be able to exploit the market power, which they 
have gained pursuant to adoption of the technology into a standard, by imposing excessive 
and discriminatory licensing terms in pursuit of maximising their profit.106 In a broader 
context, it prevents SEP holders from acting in a way which would be detrimental to the 
competition process and to consumer welfare.107  
 Since the meaning of what constitutes fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory is not 
clearly defined, legal certainty remains an issue. Therefore, some argue that the vagueness of 
the term FRAND increases the risk of disputes between SEPs holders and those who seek to 
license the SEPs since both parties may have a different view of what constitutes FRAND 
terms.108 Others, however, claim that it is exactly the vagueness that makes FRAND a 
powerful tool, incentivising SEP implementers to negotiate the best possible terms for their 
licensing agreement.109 Had the criteria been defined, it would unduly restrict business 
freedom of interested parties in the negotiation process. The Commission has noted that 
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FRAND terms are intentionally open and flexible, stating that “reasonableness” and 
“fairness” are subjective factors which are dependent on specific circumstances of each 
individual case.110 The ETSI Guide on IPR111 states in that regard that it is for the SEP owner 
and the SEP implementer to negotiate terms of use of the patent and that for that purpose, the 
parties should engage in “an impartial and honest negotiation process.”112 The ETSI IPR 
Policy does not provide for rules to resolve disputes in the event that the parties are not able to 
reach an agreement on FRAND terms, however, the Guide states that the parties should try to 
resolve any dispute on bilateral and amicable basis.113  
SSOs have abstained from defying the precise meaning of FRAND terms yet for 
another reason. Allowing an SSO, an organisation comprising of competitors within the 
relevant industry, to discuss pricing strategies would raise anti-competitive concerns under 
Article 101 TFEU.114 
Even though the rationale of FRAND terms is to minimise risk of anti-competitive 
effects ex ante, they do not prevent that issues related to Article 102 TFEU and abuse of 
dominant position will not arise.115 In the Commission’s own words, “a FRAND commitment 
cannot be considered a guarantee that a SEP holder will not abuse its market power.”116 
Telyas argues that the term FRAND is not new in the competition law context. In his 
view, the concept has been enshrined in Article 102 (a) and (c) TFEU which condemns unfair 
and discriminatory trading practices. The CJEU already held in United Brands117 that 
charging excessive118 and discriminatory prices constitutes an abuse of dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.119 Even though the case had nothing to do with 
IPRs and standards, the Commission has in its Horizontal Guidelines argued for constructing 
the FRAND concept in the light of the excessive prices line of case law, stating that licensing 
fees charged within the standard-setting context should be considered unfair or unreasonable 
as long as they do not bear any reasonable relation to the economic value of the IPR.120 
However, framing the concept of unfair and unreasonable royalty rates exclusively within the 
excessive prices line of case law may not be the most appropriate solution considering that 
licensing strategies might not only have exploitative, but also exclusionary effects on 
competitors.121 Lemley and Shapiro advocate the view that reasonable royalties should be 
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based on value of the patent-protected technological invention before it was incorporated into 
a standard. In other words, they consider as reasonable the royalties that could have been 
obtained by the SEP owner in an open competition with other technologies.122 
 FRAND does not and cannot represent a commitment to reach an agreement with a 
specific end result, since the SEP owner commits to a SSO, not to particular licensees who 
might not even be known at the time the commitment is given.123 FRAND only sets up a 
relationship between the SEP owner and the SSO.124 The commitment does not usually create 
a direct contractual relationship between the SEP owner and potential implementers, even if 
they were members of the same SSO.125 The key issue whether the FRAND commitment 
constitutes a binding contract and whether a potential licensee can rely on the SEP owner’s 
promise to license as a beneficiary depends largely on the language of the SSO IPRs’ policies, 
although in the end, it is for the applicable national law to decide.126 For instance, district 
courts in the U.S. have held in two cases that FRAND commitment creates a legally binding 
contractual obligation and that third parties can rely on that obligation as beneficiaries.127 
FRAND commitment is thus not seen as a mere promise to negotiate in a good faith, but 
rather as a commitment to grant licences and if breached, it should be remedied by a specific 
performance of contract.128 The view, however, differs between countries. Courts in 
Germany, for example, have held that FRAND commitment does not result in creation of a 
right to obtain a license, it merely serves as an invitation for offers.129 The German view is 
that FRAND is only a commitment to negotiate with potential licensees in a good faith.130  
 At the time of writing of this thesis, there are still issues raised by the FRAND 
commitments remaining to be solved. For instance, it is not entirely clear what is the value of 
FRAND terms when they are not enforceable, as SSOs lack enforcement mechanism to 
sanction disobedient SEP owners or implementers,131 or whether these terms should be 
“understood purely through the lens of contract law.”132 Furthermore, it is still highly 
disputed whether FRAND commitment should determine what kind of remedies can SEPs 
owners obtain in patent infringement proceedings.133 Questions have been raised for instance 
whether the availability of injunctive reliefs is compatible with FRAND commitment and 
competition law on abuse of dominant position.134 It is also not entirely clear whether 
FRAND licenses should be assessed under different, possibly less strict conditions, to 
constitute an abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU than in cases where the 
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license was given on non-FRAND pledged terms.135 All these issues are tied back to the 
broader question to what extent does FRAND commitment limit the exclusive right of SEP 
owners to choose whether to license their inventions and if so on what terms. In even broader 
sense, it asks how should the different legal systems – patent law, contract law and 
competition law – interact to achieve a balanced approach.136  
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3. Exercise of SEPs as an abuse of dominant position 
There is a concern from competition law perspective that SEP owners may potentially use the 
market power that they have gained upon inclusion of their patent-protected technology into a 
standard in order to distort competition by refusing to license SEP implementers or by 
imposing on them onerous licensing terms under the threat of an injunction. Although the 
issue of SEP owners’ possibility to obtain injunctions in SEPs infringement proceedings has 
not been dealt with before the CJEU previously, it raises concerns similar to cases where the 
CJEU has considered circumstances under which the exercise of IPRs can violate Article 102 
TFEU.137   
3.1. Dominant position of SEPs owners under Article 102 TFEU 
Dominant position is defined as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by 
giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers.”138 The holding of dominant position in a market 
entails a “special responsibility not to impair, by using methods other than those which come 
within the scope of competition on the merits,139 genuine undistorted competition in the 
common market.”140 It follows that in specific circumstances, a right of the dominant 
undertaking to adopt certain measures, which would be found not abusive if taken by a non-
dominant undertaking, may be encroached upon.141 Dominant position in itself is, however, 
not prohibited.  
Assessment of the patent owner’s conduct entails evaluation of his market power. 
While it is true that a patent confers on his owner a monopoly power over the invention, 
admittedly containing a right to exclude others from using part of the invention covered by the 
patent,142 this does not equate to market power within the meaning of competition law as it 
does not necessarily allow the patent owner to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of its competitors or consumers. Within the context of SEPs, the Commission has explicitly 
stated that “even if the establishment of a standard can create or increase market power of 
IPR holders […], there is no presumption that holding or exercising IPR essential to a 
standard equates to the possession or exercise of market power.”143  
The position of competition law authorities and courts is, however, not consistent. In 
the Google/Motorola merger case, the Commission held that each SEP constitutes a separate 
relevant technology market on its own, since “there is by definition no alternative or 
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substitute.”144 This finding leads to an inevitable conclusion that each SEP owner is dominant 
in the market of its technology, thus creating a presumption of dominance. This position has 
been criticized by legal scholars on the basis that there is no economic justification for 
introducing such presumption.145 The market power of the SEP owners largely depends on the 
interest in the patented technology, respectively on the success of the standard, and on the 
availability of alternative standards or non-standardised substitutes. It is true that in the 
context of network industry such as ICT, SEPs usually represent their own relevant market as 
there are no alternative standards available, and the finding of dominant position is thus 
justified.146 Nonetheless, market power must be evaluated on a case by case basis,147 and a 
SEP owner should be considered dominant only where he does not face considerable 
constraints.148  
In any event, even an existence of strong market power does not in itself constitute a 
violation of competition law, and anti-competitive conduct on the part of the dominant 
undertaking must be established.149  The following lines address anti-competitive concerns 
triggered by licensing practices.  
3.2. Refusal to deal 
A patent right confers an exclusive right to exclude others from commercial exploitation of 
the patented technology. It gives the patent owner the right to choose trading partners and 
trading terms.150 In other words, patent rights constitute means which undertakings may use 
when engaging in competition on the merits.151 The CJEU has recognized that the right to 
prevent third parties from exploiting IPRs constitutes the core of such rights and that the 
obligation to grant license would thus deprive the patent owner “of the substance of his 
exclusive right.”152 Therefore, a mere refusal to license cannot constitute an anti-competitive 
conduct and cannot amount to an abuse of dominant position. However, refusal to license 
patent-protected technology can foreclose the market to competitors, thus, in specific 
circumstances, it can raise competition law concerns,153 specifically under Article 102 (b) 
TFEU which prohibits abuses of dominant position by means of conduct “limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers.”  
 The CJEU has held that refusal to license an IPR can amount to an abuse of dominant 
position where four cumulative conditions are fulfilled: the refusal (1) is likely to eliminate all 
competition on the secondary market on the part of the person seeking the license, (2) the 
access to the input is indispensable to carrying on the person’s business on the secondary 
market, in that there be no actual or potential substitutes, (3) prevents an emergence of new 
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products for which there is a potential consumer demand, and (4) is incapable of being 
objectively justified.154 The theory of harm behind the refusal to license doctrine is based on 
the theory of transfer of power. The idea is that an undertaking which is dominant on the 
upstream market should not be allowed to use its position in a secondary market by refusing 
to license to its competitors. It presupposes anti-competitive conduct on the part of vertically-
integrated undertakings.155 
The so-called exceptional circumstances test was adopted in Magill,156 and elaborated 
on in IMS Health157 and Microsoft158 which represent the latest cases on refusal to license.159 
In the IMS Health case, which concerned a de facto industry standard,160 the Court clarified 
the condition of indispensability, recalling the Oscar Bronner161 judgment, and stated that it is 
only fulfilled where there are “no alternative solutions, even if they are less advantageous, 
and [where] there are technical, legal or economic obstacles capable of making it impossible 
or at least unreasonably difficult” for other undertakings to create alternative products.162 In 
that connection the Court held that it would be necessary for the referring court to determine 
whether users of the brick structure were unable to use alternative substitutes.163 Nevertheless, 
the case was quite controversial considering that there was no secondary market for the 
product developed by IMS Health.164 The Court has held that “it is sufficient that a potential 
or even a hypothetical secondary market can be identified.”165 In that way it substantially 
relaxed the conditions of the exceptional circumstances test as adopted in Magill.166 The 
criterion of emergence of a new product was even further diminished in Microsoft, where the 
General Court held that the exceptional circumstances have not been exhaustively set out in 
Magill and IMS Health and that a refusal to license may constitute an abuse of dominant 
position not only where it prevents a new product from emergence, but in accordance with 
Article 102 (b) TFEU also where it might limit technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers.167 Petit, however, argues that this elimination of the new product requirement was 
“implicitly disavowed” in the 2012 Microsoft168 judgment.169 It is questionable to what extent 
does the situation where an IPR owner builds a secondary market which it subsequently tries 
                                                 
154 C-241/91 P & C-242/91 RTE and ITP v European Commission, judgment of 6 April 1995, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (“Magill”), paras. 52 – 56  
155 Petit, op. cit., p. 7 
156 C-241/91 P & C-242/91 RTE and ITP v European Commission, judgment of 6 April 1995, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (“Magill”) 
157 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG., judgment of 29 April 2004, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:257 (“IMS Health”) 
158 T-201/04 Microsoft Corporation v European Commission, judgment of 17 September 2007, 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (“Microsoft 2007”) 
159 Telyas, op. cit., p. 179 
160 IMS Health developed a format to present the data on the sale of pharmaceuticals, “brick structure” 
161 C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co.KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co.KG., 
judgment of 26 November 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 
162 IMS Health, para. 28 
163 Ibid., paras. 29 – 30  
164 Ibid., para. 43 
165 Ibid., para. 44 
166 Telyas, op. cit., p. 180 – 181  
167 Microsoft 2007, para. 647   
168 T-167/08 Microsoft Corporation v European Commission, judgment of 27 June 2012, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 
(“Microsoft 2012”) 
169 Petit, op. cit., p. 30 
23 
 
to reserve for itself by refusing to license play a role in the assessment of the abuse. Even 
though the General Court did not refer to this issue in the judgment itself, the Commission in 
its previous investigation pointed to the fact that Microsoft, by refusing to license, tried to 
disrupt previous established levels of supply, an issue which was of importance in the early 
case law of United Brands170 or Commercial Solvents.171    
The exceptional circumstances line of case law relies on “essential facilities doctrine” 
as adopted in Commercial Solvents and further developed in Oscar Bronner. Even though the 
CJEU has never used the wording, it held that an undertaking dominant in the market may be 
required to grant access to an input essential for providing services in a secondary or 
downstream market. As seen from the foregoing, the same approach was adopted within the 
context of IPRs, where access on competition law grounds is required where the IPR in 
question constitutes an essential input. Even though neither of the case discussed concerned 
patent rights, it has been recognized that competition law does not differentiate between 
different intellectual property rights.172 Thus, there is nothing preventing the approach 
adopted within the context of copyright-protected information from being applied to patent-
protected technology. While it is true that a remedy of compulsory licensing is available under 
the patent law system, the purpose of that remedy is different from the intervention on the 
competition law basis. Compulsory licenses can generally be granted only where there are 
issues of morality and public health, whereas competition law aims to prevent anti-
competitive conduct and distortion of competition.173     
 In the same way as a refusal to license an “ordinary” patent, a refusal to license a SEP 
can in exceptional circumstances amount to an abuse of dominant position under Article 102 
(b) TFEU since such refusal allows a SEP owner to exclude SEP implementers from the 
market of standard compliant goods. In the context of ICT industry and network protocol 
SEPs, it allows the SEP owner to exclude the implementers from the entire product market. 
That is the case where owners of network protocol SEPs also compete on the market for 
mobile telephone devices and by refusing to license their network protocol SEPs to other 
mobile telephone manufacturers, they are able to foreclose the entire downstream market.174 
In the context of SEPs it is always possible to distinguish two separate markets since the 
technology market which comprises of SEPs is separate from a product market where the 
patent-protected technology is actually being used.175 Regarding the IMS Health controversy 
about the non-existing secondary market, such issue would thus not arise within the context of 
SEPs.  
 Petrovčič illustrates the fulfilment of exceptional circumstances under the Magill/IMS 
Health test within the context of SEPs in regard to the GSM standard at the time when it 
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represented a de facto standard for the participation in the EU market for mobile devices. The 
refusal to license the GSM standard would be likely to eliminate all competition on the 
downstream market as the mobile devices would not interoperate with other devices which 
were based on the GSM standard and which were predominant on the European market. The 
access would be indispensable to carrying on the business in the downstream market given 
that the GSM standard was a de facto requirement for participation in the EU market for 
mobile devices.176 Even though in light of Oscar Bronner case law, indispensability might not 
be fulfilled where there are other competing standards or non-standardised technologies 
available to the prospective licensees, although less attractive, as Petrovčič notes, it is highly 
unlikely that an owner of an SEP would be found dominant without the SEP being considered 
as indispensable. Indeed, the Commission and the CJEU often infer indispensability of an 
input from the undertaking’s dominant position.177 The refusal would also be liable to prevent 
release of new mobile devices. In regard to the fulfilment of the requirement of 
indispensability, Petit refers to the Commission’s Guidance Paper on Enforcement Priorities 
which acknowledges that where “requesting undertaking […] had made relationship-specific 
investments in order to use the subsequently refused input,” the input at issue may more likely 
be regarded as indispensable.178 This is because in the standardisation context, “ex post design 
decisions are specifically based on the essential technologies selected ex ante.”179 
Nonetheless, the requirement of indispensability would not be hard to fulfil under the 
Microsoft test anyway as even an emergence of mobile devices which would contain only a 
minor difference to the devices already available on the market would be captured by the test, 
respectively by the notion of technical development.180  
Considering that the exceptional circumstances doctrine was developed in cases where 
IPR owners never expressed their intention to grant licences to others, liability under 
competition law is even more likely to arise within the context of SEPs voluntarily committed 
by their owners to be licensed under FRAND terms.181 
3.3. Excessive royalties 
Article 102 TFEU explicitly prohibits dominant undertakings from imposing unfair pricing or 
trading conditions. It has been clarified by the case law that the term “unfair” encompasses 
“excessive”182. In that regard, the CJEU has stated that IPR owners are not free to demand the 
highest possible remuneration, but only remuneration that is appropriate.183 In the context of 
SEPs, the appropriateness of remuneration can perhaps be equated with the term FRAND. 
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Under these observations, demanding excessive royalties for the use of SEPs could amount to 
an abuse of dominant position.184  
 Even though Article 102 TFEU provides basis for competition law intervention 
towards excessive prices, it is hardly ever applied in practise in regard to exploitative abuses. 
Such approach is based on the assumption that high prices generally attract new entrants to 
the market which in the end leads to reduction of prices between the competitors to 
competitive level. Thus, the intervention is unnecessary since the market disposes of the 
ability to self-correct.185 The competition authorities only intervene in markets where there is 
a presence of a significant barrier to entry, such as in cases of natural and legal monopolies, 
which is also a case of IPRs.186 The Commission has stressed that although its enforcement 
priorities are set on practises that aim to exclude competitors from the market, it will take 
action even in regard to exploitative practices where the protection of consumers and 
functioning of the market could not be ensured adequately by other means.187 It has been 
suggested that such is the case of SEPs where the network effects and the standardisation 
context prevent self-correct mechanisms from being developed in the market, thus justifying 
competition law intervention against exploitative practices of the SEPs’ owners.188  
 Nevertheless, competition law intervention against exploitative practices still 
represents a contentious issue. To start with, it appears as highly problematic to draw a clear 
line between high royalties which are legitimate and high royalties which are exploitative.189 
In that regard it is highly disputable whether determination of fair royalties should be a task 
for competition authorities or courts or whether it should rather be left to public regulators.190 
In case of the former, there is a risk of competition authorities being too occupied with 
determining the level of fair licensing fees between competitors which could potentially 
undermine their primary role of overseeing protection of competition, as such, on the 
market.191  
On the other hand, the situation where no uniform legal approach has been adopted for 
assessment of whether royalties are exploitative or not contributes to legal uncertainty of SEP 
owners about the royalty fees that they charge. In such a case, the space that evaluation of 
exploitative practices leaves for erroneous decisions192 which are liable to discourage the SEP 
owners’ engagement in the standardisation process in the future is considerable.193 Some 
economists even argue that higher prices actually encourage innovation, meaning that they 
can increase the efficiency of high-tech industries, and that enforcement on competition law 
grounds would not, in any event, improve the conditions on such markets, but would rather 
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have the opposite effect.194 Given the divergent views in economic and legal theory, Petrovčič 
argues that competition authorities should only intervene in case where there is a clear 
evidence showing that the imposition of excessive royalties had an actual negative impact on 
consumers, the product market and the standardisation process.195 In other words, a 
demonstration of anti-competitive effects of the conduct should be required. Even though a 
direct harm inflicted upon consumers by passing on to them higher prices of the standard 
compliant goods can generally be established, there is in principle a little evidence of any 
harm on the product market or the effectiveness of the standardisation process.196  
 The Commission’s statement on Qualcomm197 illustrates its approach towards 
exploitative practices within the standardisation context. The Commission has conducted 
investigation into Qualcomm’s alleged exploitative conduct of charging royalties that were 
not FRAND despite Qualcomm’s commitment prior to the adoption of the WCDMA standard. 
Even though the proceedings were eventually closed upon withdrawal of the competitors’ 
complaints, the Commission has expressed a view that a finding of exploitative abuse of 
dominant position may depend on whether the licensing terms were imposed in breach of the 
FRAND commitment.198 However, despite the statement and two other investigations,199 not a 
single SEP owner has been condemned by the Commission for the imposition of excessive 
royalties to date.200 
 Nevertheless, the situation is different in regard to excessive prices which have 
exclusionary effect. Practices where licensing offers are not genuine and where SEP owners 
are only willing to license on prohibitive terms are also referred to as constructive refusals to 
deal.201 In the standardisation context, it is typically the constructive refusal to supply that can 
arise rather than outright refusal since “the typical SEP owner is probably not seeking 
exclusion, but rather licensing fees.”202 Such conclusion would all the more conform to the 
premise that SEP owners have, after all, an interest in broad interpretation of standards, since 
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the broader it is, the more they can generate in terms of royalties. The assessment of the anti-
competitive conduct of excessive prices which may have exclusionary effect is generally done 
under the doctrine of refusal to deal since the key feature is not the price itself, but rather its 
effect on foreclosing the market to competitors.203    
3.4. Competition on the merits  
Since the conduct of seeking injunctions in SEPs infringement proceedings might not 
precisely fit into either of the abuses doctrines identified above, Jones and Zografos204 argue 
that the CJEU may decide to assess the Huawei v ZTE case under the competition on the 
merits doctrine as applied in AstraZeneca. In that case, the CJEU had to deal with misuse of a 
patent system under Article 102 TFEU, an issue which had not been considered by the EU 
courts before.205 The CJEU has recalled that Article 102 TFEU prohibits dominant 
undertakings from eliminating their competitors from the market by having recourse to 
“methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits.”206 Even 
though such conduct is not in itself sufficient to constitute a violation of Article 102 TFEU 
and anti-competitive effects must be demonstrated, the legal standard is not very high since it 
is enough to demonstrate potential anti-competitive effects for the conduct to fall under the 
prohibition contained in Article 102 TFEU.207 The dominant undertaking can, however, 
provide objective justification for its conduct.208  
Had the Court decided to assess the SEP owner’s conduct of seeking injunctions under 
the AstraZeneca approach, Jones holds that the conduct which under the specific 
circumstances of the case is liable to result in hold-up and which is contrary to the objective 
of the voluntary FRAND commitment given by the SEP owner should not be seen as falling 
under the scope of competition on the merits, unless the SEP owner can justify it by 
demonstrating that he has been behaving in that way in order to secure protection of his 
investment, for instance by demonstrating that the implementer was not a willing licensee.209  
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4. Enforcement of SEPs  
4.1. Patent law remedies – injunctions and damages 
The powerful effect of patents in business negotiations directly follows from the patent law 
system and the remedies that the system offers for those who prove validity and infringement 
of their patents.210 In other words, remedies play an important role in licensing negotiations 
since they set the framework for manoeuvre for both parties.211 Both international treaties and 
EU legislation aim to ensure that effective remedies, for patent law infringements it is 
traditionally damages and injunctions,212 are provided.213 The right to obtain an effective 
remedy for an infringement of rights is among others enshrined in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and Article 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (“Charter”).214 
Even though patent rights remain to be territorially limited, remedies for infringement 
of IPRs have been partially harmonised in the EU by the Enforcement Directive.215 Setting a 
minimum standard, the Directive, in accordance with Article 8(2) of the TRIPs Agreement,216 
requires Member States to provide IPR owners with certain measures in order to attain 
effective enforcement of their rights.217 Thus, same remedies are available in each 
jurisdiction. What differs is the procedure for obtaining them.218 The inconsistent approach 
between Member States leads to forum shopping and raises questions of legitimacy of the 
enforcement system. This is particularly problematic in relation to the doctrinal disputes over 
the actual existence of patent hold-ups. Following these considerations, it appears that the 
current enforcement system is prone to abuse.219  
Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive provides that Member States have to ensure 
that judicial authorities may issue an injunction against an infringer of an IPR with the aim of 
prohibiting the continuation of the infringement.  
Article 12 of the Enforcement Directive allows Member States to provide in 
appropriate cases for monetary compensation instead of injunctions if the infringer has acted 
unintentionally and without negligence and if injunction would cause disproportionate harm 
and monetary compensation would be adequate. The provision thus allows Member States to 
adopt rules similar to the U.S. eBay rule.220 In the 2006 eBay decision,221 the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that in order to obtain a permanent injunction, four criteria must be 
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fulfilled. The plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has suffered an irreparable injury, (2) 
other available remedies such as monetary compensation are not adequate to compensate the 
injury suffered, (3) a remedy in equity is warranted considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and the defendant and (4) issuing a permanent injunction would not be 
against the public interest.222 Even though eBay is claimed to be based on established 
principles of equity, it substantially alters the playing field to the benefit of the defendant by 
placing the burden of proof strictly on the plaintiff, instead of providing for traditional 
equitable balancing.223 The European approach as contained in Article 12 of the Enforcement 
Directive appears to offer for a more balanced solution in avoiding patent hold-up since it 
rather focuses on the proportionality and adequacy of remedies.224 However, the Directive 
“merely authorises [the] Member States to implement such a rule“225 in their national legal 
systems, it does not have the force of law in itself and cannot be thus relied on in individual 
legal proceedings.  
When interpreting the provisions of the Enforcement Directive, account has to be 
taken of Article 3 (2) which provides that “[…] remedies shall also be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.” The requirement of 
proportionality has been interpreted by the CJEU in Scarlet Extended226 and SABAM227 as 
requiring the balance between IPR protection and fundamental rights of the defendant, in the 
particular case the freedom to conduct business pursuant to Article 16 of the Charter.228 The 
case admittedly did not concern competition law, but the possibility to grant injunctions 
against internet service providers who were required to adopt technical measures aimed at 
preventing copyright infringement. The Court held that even though IPRs are protected under 
Article 17(2) of the Charter neither the provision itself, nor the case law suggests that the 
protection is absolute.229 It follows from the judgment that injunctions can only be granted as 
long as they respect that fair balance is struck between the rights of the IPR owner and the 
defendant. As a general principle of EU law, the principle of proportionality should thus be 
adhered to when establishing the circumstances under which the assertion of rights can 
amount to an abuse.230 Furthermore, in accordance with recital 12 of the Enforcement 
Directive, the measures provided for safeguarding the effective protection of IPRs should not 
be used in a way that could restrict competition “unduly in a manner contrary to [Articles 101 
and 102 of] the Treaty.”231 
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Injunctive reliefs, which are aimed at preventing imminent threats of infringement or 
at stopping infringers from continuing the infringement, are vital for securing protection of 
IPRs, especially in high technology industries.232 Legal theory distinguishes between 
preliminary (interlocutory) injunctions which as provisional measures are granted pending the 
case, and final (permanent) injunctions which are issued once the case is resolved.233 When 
pursuing a final or permanent injunction, the patent owner must prove that his patent has been 
infringed234 and where a counterclaim concerning validity of the patent is raised, the patent 
owner must successfully disprove it.  
The availability of injunctions within the standardisation context has been subject to 
debates. There is a danger that too interventionist approach with complete elimination of 
injunctions as even potential remedies could result in discouragement of SEP owners from 
contributing their technologies to standardisation with the fear that they will not be rewarded 
for the value of their inventions.235 On the other hand, little or no intervention would enable 
SEP owners to gain monopoly power with a potential of discouraging further innovation from 
other ICT industry participants.236      
The possibility to obtain injunctions plays an important role especially in Europe 
where the rationale of providing damages is to compensate, not to punish as is the case in the 
U.S.,237 which leads only to a little private competition law litigation in Europe.238 Moreover, 
since damages do not bring infringements to an end, they do not always constitute an effective 
remedy.239 In case of total elimination of injunctions, there is a danger that legal proceedings 
could last a lifetime of the patent, thus leaving the patentee without adequate protection 
against possible misuse of his invention.240  
Nonetheless, when determining damages in SEPs disputes, the view of legal 
scholarship is not unified as to whether these should be calculated on the basis of FRAND 
royalty241 or rather on the basis of lost profit of the SEP owner or according to the profits 
made by the infringer of the SEP. However, the debate in Europe has been purely theoretical 
so far as there is no existing case law on that matter.242 In the U.S., it has been suggested that 
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damages should be determined on the basis of hypothetical licensing terms that the parties 
would have negotiated before the patent-protected technology was adopted into a standard.243  
4.2. Enforcement of rights or abusive litigation?  
The right to seek an injunction forms an integral part of the exclusive rights conferred on 
patent owners. It aims to protect their incentives to innovate and at the same time discourage 
potential infringers. However, the concern from competition law perspective is that 
injunctions will not be used only in a lawful way as a means of enforcing ones’ rights, but 
rather as a threat to distort competition by forcing SEP implementers to agree on licensing 
terms that they would not have agreed to prior to the inclusion of the patented technology into 
a standard.    
The possibility to exclude others from competition even through the means of 
litigation is inherent in the exclusive patent right conferred on its owner.244 Nonetheless, as 
has been held by the General Court, even litigation, provided that it is vexatious,245 can 
amount to an abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.  
The legal test, which has been established246 in ITT Promedia,247 and later confirmed 
in Protégé International,248 stipulates that the initiation of legal proceedings can constitute an 
abuse of dominant position only in situation where a dominant undertaking “brings an action 
(1) which cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish its rights and can 
therefore only serve to harass the opposite party and (2) which is conceived in the framework 
of a plan whose goal is to eliminate competition.”249 Given that the criteria, which need to be 
fulfilled cumulatively, constitute an exception to the fundamental right of access to courts, 
they have to be applied and construed strictly.250 Such high legal standard requires the 
Commission to prove that the undertaking’s conduct of initiating legal proceedings was 
manifestly unfounded.251 Regarding the first subjective criterion, the General Court has 
emphasised that as long as “an action was intended to assert what the undertaking could, at 
that moment, reasonably consider to be its rights,” there is no abuse within the meaning of 
Article 102 TFEU.252 The second criterion, which is objective in nature, seeks to determine 
whether the allegedly abusive conduct was part of a broader plan to eliminate competition in 
the market. As Petit points up, this criterion seeks to determine whether there was a 
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consistency in the dominant undertaking’s practises. In that regard, he refers to the judgement 
in Tetra Pak II, where the General Court held that “whole series of important and convergent 
factors” supporting the finding of the undertaking’s intent must to be proved.253 Moreover, the 
wording of the second criterion suggests that the purpose of the plan has to be exclusionary 
and that a mere imposition of onerous licensing terms would not satisfy this criterion.254 
The two cases illustrate the standing that competition law cannot prevent undertakings 
from enforcing their rights in courts. Reaching the opposite conclusion would jeopardise 
fundamental rights, in particular the right of access to courts, and would also threaten to 
undermine the goal of effective competition by diminishing undertakings’ incentives to 
innovate.255 The rationale of the abusive litigation test is that competition law should only 
prevent IPR owners from seeking remedies where these are pursued in order to achieve anti-
competitive aims to the detriment of public interest.256 
Applying the abusive litigation test to a situation of enforcing SEPs in courts, Telyas 
argues that the right to exclude “is not a prerequisite for maintaining [the SEP owners’] 
incentive to innovate”257 since they knowingly trade off their exclusive right to decide the 
terms of their licences by the voluntary FRAND commitment, given with the view of gaining 
monetary compensation for the wide-spread implementation of the standard. In Telyas’ view, 
by committing to license their technology on FRAND terms, SEPs owners give up any 
possibility of providing objective justification for seeking injunctions. It should only be 
possible for SEP owners to have recourse to injunctions where the alleged infringers have not 
genuinely been willing to take a license on FRAND terms.258 Telyas concludes that “the 
assertion of SEPs (or threat hereof) against a good faith potential licensee should be 
considered one of the “wholly exceptional circumstances” [within the meaning of the ITT 
Promedia line of case law] in which the reliance on statutory rights may constitute abuse, 
because in light of the FRAND commitment, doing so serves only to harass the defendant and 
eliminate competition.”259  
The abusive litigation test is consistent with the provisions of freedom to conduct 
business as enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter and right to access courts as enshrined in 
Article 47 of the Charter, particularly the latter being of vital importance, since without the 
right of access to courts all other rights could not be effectively enforced.260 Same as the 
refusal to deal test, it only condemns practices that are exclusionary. Thus, the legal test 
would not be applicable towards SEP disputes over injunctions that are used not in order to 
eliminate competitors from the market, but rather to extract higher royalties.  
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However, as suggested by Petit, the abusive litigation test might not be the likely legal 
standard to be used for assessing the availability of injunctions.261 In order to understand this 
position, one has to go back to the General Court’s ruling in Micro Business Leader,262 on the 
issue of potential abuse of dominant position through the enforcement of copyright. In that 
case, Microsoft, a holder of the copyright, who was allegedly dominant on the market 
attempted to block importation by Micro Leader Business of infringing products into France. 
The General Court noted that “such enforcement [as in this particular case] may, in 
exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct.”263 In that regard, it referred to the 
judgment in Magill264 which seems to show that it considers the notion of exceptional 
circumstance used for assessing potential abuse through exercise of IPRs to be the same for 
enforcement of IPRs, at least through certain means. The case law of the General Court 
suggests that the court distinguishes between the situation of enforcement of rights through 
means of litigation on one hand and enforcement of IPRs through means of blocking 
importation of infringing products on the other hand. As Petit notes, injunctive reliefs in the 
SEPs context are rather similar to the latter situation of enforcement through blocking 
importation of infringing products,265 since both have the same effect on competition in the 
market – they are able to exclude competing products.  
4.3. The threat of injunctions in disputes over SEPs – the U.S. perspective 
As already articulated above, there is a concern that injunctions might be used by SEP owners 
as tools enabling them to either exclude their competitors from the market or to demand 
excessive royalties. In both scenarios, injunctions would lead to SEP implementers being held 
up by owners of the SEPs. Since the phenomenon of hold up has its roots in the patent law 
system, both the practise and the doctrine in the U.S. suggest that it should be solved with the 
help of patent law tools.266  
The current legal standard of assessing whether injunctions should be granted in patent 
law disputes is based on the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in eBay. eBay modified then 
existing approach applied by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which stated that 
injunctions were to be granted upon establishing an infringement of a patent unless there were 
exceptional circumstances or a need to protect public interest. The Supreme Court reversed 
this rule by holding that granting of injunctions rests within the discretion of district courts 
which has to be exercised within the framework of the traditional principles of equity.267 In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy expressed a view that granting injunctions might not 
be appropriate especially in cases such as the present, where the patent owner is a non-
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practising entity268 and where the threat of injunctions is thus prone to be used in order to 
obtain leverage in commercial negotiations. Justice Kennedy concluded that in situations 
where injunctions are used as bargaining tools and where patented inventions form only a 
small component of the final product, damages appear to be a sufficient remedy for the patent 
owner to compensate infringement of his patent.269 In that regard, Cotter implies that the 
Court’s opinion should remain of valid consideration in the context of SEPs where final 
products are designed pursuant to standards incorporating numerous individual patents and 
where implementers cannot easily switch to alternative technologies once a standard has been 
adopted.270 The equitable balancing of the four factor eBay test allows, precisely, for taking 
into account “technological and legal developments in the patent system.”271 In any event, 
since the decision in eBay admittedly concerned a specific situation of a non-practising entity, 
some authors have expressed doubts as to the substantial shift of the approach to injunctions 
under “normal” circumstances.272 
It is disputable to what extent should FRAND commitment affect the possibility to 
obtain an injunction.273 Kesan and Hayes maintain that under FRAND commitment, SEP 
owners should only be entitled to claim damages but not injunctions. They explain their 
position on the basis of Calabresi and Melamed’s theory of distinction between property and 
liability rules.274 The foundation of the theory is that interests of individual members or 
groups of society may generally be protected by property rules or liability rules. While 
property rules confer the right to exclude, injunctions can thus be characterised as property 
rules, liability rules confer a right to obtain compensation. Unlike liability rules, application of 
property rules is appropriate where the aim is to deter conduct that is viewed as harmful by 
the whole society. Although the potential harm to consumers in the form of excessive prices 
may call for arguing against issuing of injunctions as a general rule, injunctions appear to be 
desirable to be preserved for the interests of society mainly in cases of deliberate 
infringements, and in the standardisation context, particularly where there is a legitimate fear 
that SEP implementers could free ride on technological inventions. Nonetheless, since the two 
situations illustrated above constitute “very limited circumstances,” Kesan and Hayes argue 
that injunctions in general should not be available as remedies in the standardisation context. 
In their view, FRAND commitment should be construed as a waiver of the property rule to 
preserve exclusivity in the form of an injunction, into a liability rule which instead only 
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allows for compensation, in the form of monetary damages for past infringements and 
ongoing royalties for future infringements.275 
Considering injunctive reliefs in the context of standardisation in the approach of U.S. 
courts after eBay, the Ninth Circuit in an interlocutory appeal in Microsoft v Motorola276 
noted in obiter dicta that “injunctive relief is arguably a remedy inconsistent with the 
[FRAND] licensing commitment,”277 and that the only remedy consistent with the contractual 
commitment would be for the court “to set a reasonably royalty rate and have it applied 
retrospectively.”278 To put it into perspective, the U.S. Department of Justice has similarly 
suggested that rather than an injunction, a monetary compensation in the form of ongoing 
royalties appears to be more appropriate remedy. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, it however 
narrowed down such approach to cases where the SEP owner is a non-practicing entity.279 
Outside the scenario of SEP owners as non-practising entities, it appears from the judgment in 
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,280 where the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal held that 
injunctions for FRAND-pledged SEPs cannot be excluded and that the availability of 
injunctions should be assessed under the eBay framework which in the Federal Circuit’s view 
provides flexibility for “addressing the unique aspects of FRAND committed patents and 
industry standards in general,”281 that the courts would not rule out the availability of 
injunctions in general, but would rather focus on equitable balancing of interests of the parties 
at dispute.   
The reasons why addressing SEP owner’s conduct of seeking an injunction under anti-
trust law is rare in the U.S. is that a claim based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, an 
equivalent of Article 102 TFEU which, however, only prohibits unlawful monopolisation,282 
has to satisfy a high legal standard requiring a proof of market power, existence of anti-
competitive conduct and the undertaking’s intent. In order to succeed with a claim under the 
Sherman Act, it has to be established that the anti-competitive behaviour has harmed the 
competition on the market, not only the competitor.283 Rambus Inc. v FTC,284 a leading case 
on deceptive behaviour during a standard-setting process, considerably limited the application 
of anti-trust laws to patent law cases285 by emphasising a principle established in the Supreme 
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Court’s case of NYNEX Corp.286 that deceptive behaviour, even though it leads to imposition 
of higher prices on consumers does not per se violate anti-trust law as long as the increase in 
prices directly follows from lawful exercise of monopoly power.287 Moreover, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine as applied in Apple Inc. v Motorola Inc.288 limits the possibility to raise 
an anti-trust law counterclaim in patent infringement suits. In essence, the immunity from 
anti-trust law provided for by the doctrine applies where the allegedly anti-competitive 
conduct arises from an attempt to enforce one’s rights in a court.289  
Nonetheless, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which is one of the bodies 
entitled to enforce anti-trust law, can also address the issue of seeking injunctions under 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) which prohibits unfair methods 
of competition.290 In January 2013, the FTC challenged Google’s conduct of seeking 
injunctions based on SEPs which it recently acquired from Motorola Mobility against 
implementers who were willing to take a license on FRAND terms under the unfair 
competition rules contained in Section 5 of the FTC Act.291 Concluding that such behaviour 
indeed violated the unfair competition rules, it finally adopted a consent order,292 where 
Google agreed to cease from the conduct.293 The consent order states that in order to avoid 
violation of the unfair competition rules, Google cannot seek injunctions before making offers 
to the prospective licensees to conclude FRAND licensing agreement. Exceptions apply only 
where, for instance, the prospective licensee refuses in writing to conclude a licensing 
agreement or where it does not accept an agreement where FRAND terms are set up by a 
court or an arbitrator.294 The order specifies a procedure for establishing a FRAND licensing 
agreement. In essence, the parties have to agree to negotiate the terms of the licensing 
agreement for a period not less than 6 months. Only after that, or at any time after 60 days 
from the request of the prospective license, is the SEP owner allowed to send to the 
prospective licensee the proposed agreement. Subsequently, the prospective licensee can 
either execute the agreement or indicate which terms of the agreement it does not consider to 
be FRAND, propose an alteration and turn to a court or an arbitrator for determination of 
FRAND licensing terms.295  
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5. Seeking injunctions against SEPs implementers as an abuse of 
dominant position 
There have been few cases across Europe and three Commission’s decisions that specifically 
touched upon the issue of seeking or threatening to seek injunctions in SEPs disputes. First 
judgment of the CJEU on the matter has been rendered out only recently. As will be seen 
below, the tests for assessing the conduct of seeking injunctions differs in the approaches of 
national courts, the Commission, the AG’s opinion and the CJEU’s judgment.    
5.1. Approaches adopted by national courts  
The cases before national courts which concern the issue of availability of injunctions are 
generally patent infringement proceedings where the alleged infringers try to defend their 
behaviour under the so-called FRAND defence,296 a specific form of a competition law 
defence.297 Even though the defence, having its origin in competition law, is available in all 
EU Member States, the requirements for successfully raising it, may, however, vary between 
the jurisdictions.298 In that regard, it has been subject to debates whether those requirements 
allow for an appropriate balance to be set in order to secure both the protection of rights 
holders and public interest.299 While it is true that some injunctions related to infringements of 
SEPs have been granted, namely in Germany,300 there appears to be no case “in which a final 
injunction has ever been enforced in the case of a SEP in the telecoms sector where a FRAND 
defence has been raised.”301  
5.1.1. Germany 
Germany has become a popular forum for SEP owners since the courts there almost always 
grant the patent owner injunction, subject only to successful competition law defence raised 
by the defendant.302 
Jurisdiction of German courts is specific in a way that patent validity disputes are tried 
in the Federal Patent Court in Munich, whereas patent infringement proceedings are heard by 
specialised chambers of the 16 district courts (Landgericht). This bifurcation leads to a 
situation that it is not possible to dispute validity of the patent in the course of the 
infringement proceedings, which provides yet another explanation for increased popularity for 
filing patent infringement suits in Germany. According to the German Act on Improving 
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Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights which implements the Enforcement Directive, 
preliminary injunctions can only be issued upon an existence of a fumus boni iuris,303 
meaning that they can only be obtained if the patent is valid beyond doubt.304 The law also 
contains a requirement of balancing of hardships which has to be done within the assessment 
of whether an injunction should be granted or not and which “according to some, is not 
different from that occurring in common law jurisdictions.”305 Permanent injunctions, on the 
other hand, are issued without a possibility to take into account discretionary considerations, 
unlike under the common law approach, save for situations of extreme likelihood of invalidity 
of the patent or competition law violation in the form of abuse of dominant position.306 Such 
approach follows from the German legal tradition which provides strong protection of rights 
to IP owners.307 
German law treats prospective licensees as being entitled to obtain a license under 
competition law claim. However, where a prospective licensee already uses a SEP without 
having a license, it is not sufficient to prove that he has been denied the license in order to 
successfully raise the competition law defence.308 The conditions under which the alleged 
infringer can rely on competition law defence in proceedings initiated by the patent owner 
have been articulated by the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) in the 
Orange-Book-Standard decision,309 which to date represents the legal standard.310  
The German Federal Supreme Court held that the prospective licensee has to behave 
as if already possessing a FRAND license. In other words, the prospective licensee has to 
demonstrate its willingness to take a license on FRAND terms by making a genuine 
unconditional offer to conclude a licensing agreement.311 The prospective licensee has to 
consider itself bound by that offer, meaning that the offer must be of such nature that the 
patentee cannot refuse it without violating competition law.312 The offer should either include 
a proposed FRAND royalty or the prospective licensee can leave it to the SEP owner to 
specify the FRAND royalty, subject to a court review.313 Concerns have been raised in that 
regard that as SEP implementers might not know what constitutes common terms on the 
market defined by the standard, they might offer royalties higher that what would have been 
considered as FRAND in order to make sure that they comply with the Orange-Book-
Standard.314 In any event, since the prospective licensee must already satisfy the obligations 
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which will be binding on him pursuant to the future licensing agreement,315 it is required that 
the patentee either obtains a payment of reasonable royalty rate or is guaranteed such payment 
“by putting a sufficient amount in escrow for the time of use of the patented technology.”316  
It follows from the foregoing that the Orange-Book-Standard approach represents a 
formalistic legal test, based on fulfilment of certain conditions which is not well suited for 
balancing of the interests at stake.317 Moreover, it has to be pointed up that the case concerned 
a de facto industry standard318 without FRAND commitment, where the validity of the patent 
at issue had already been established previously.319 The application of the Orange-Book-
Standard requirements by lower courts in cases where validity of the patents has not been 
fully reviewed, and where some of them have adopted striking interpretations of the 
conditions, stating for instance that “willingness [to take license on FRAND terms] implies 
foregoing the right to challenge the validity of the patent,”320 thus raises a bit of controversy 
in terms of compatibility with the precedential judgement.321 Irrespective of the differences, 
the Orange-Book judgement was applied by the lower courts even in proceedings concerning 
FRAND-pledged SEPs developed within the context of SSOs.322  
In Motorola Mobility v Apple,323 the Mannheim District Court ordered Apple to cease 
offering products in Germany which incorporated Motorola’s patents essential to the General 
Packet Radio standard (“GPRS”). The court reached such conclusion despite Apple’s six 
offers to pay FRAND royalties324 by which Apple aimed to qualify as a willing licensee under 
the Orange-Book-Standard case.325 The enforcement of the injunction was later suspended by 
the Karlsruhe Appellate Court on the basis that Apple’s sixth offer was sufficient enough to 
satisfy the willing licensee requirement under the Orange-Book-Standard.326 Even though 
Apple and Motorola signed a settlement agreement,327 the case became a centre part of the 
infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission against Motorola, later resulting in the 
adoption of the Motorola Mobility infringement decision. 
The strict interpretation of the Orange-Book-Standard conditions by the lower courts 
leads to difficulties in successfully raising the FRAND defence. Jones argues that the relative 
easiness for SEP owners to obtain injunctions in Germany may lead to situations where SEP 
implementers rather accept higher royalty rates in order to avoid being excluded from the 
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biggest mobile telephony market in the EU. The attractiveness of Germany as a forum of 
choice for resolving global disputes can be illustrated by the Huawei v ZTE case which 
despite representing a conflict between two Chinese electronics companies is being tried in 
the Regional Court of Düsseldorf.328 
5.1.2. The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is an attractive forum for patent infringement proceedings as it has a speedy 
procedure and specialised courts which have an exclusive jurisdiction to handle patent 
infringement disputes, in particular the District Court of The Hague and The Hague Court of 
Appeal.329  
In the case of Philips v SK Kassetten,330 the District Court of The Hague adopted a 
seemingly patentee friendly approach. Since no offer has been made by the alleged infringer, 
the court rejected the FRAND competition law defence. It held that as long as the defendant 
“had not actually converted its alleged entitlement to a FRAND license into an actual 
license,” 331 there is no basis in law which would allow the defendant to implement the SEP or 
which would prevent the SEP owner from enforcing his rights by demanding that an 
injunction is issued. In the court’s view, the defendant in this particular case should have 
proactively sought a license from the SEP owner.332 Nevertheless, the court did not rule out 
the possibility to raise competition law defence in special circumstances, which it elaborated 
on in subsequent case law.333 
In deciding on whether to issue injunctions, the courts in the Netherlands take into 
consideration numerous circumstances that could be potentially relevant, trying to strike a 
balance between the interests at stake.334 For instance, in Phillips v LG335 and Samsung v 
Apple (2012),336 the injunctions were not granted on basis of good faith negotiations initiated 
by the alleged infringers.337 In the latter case, the District Court of The Hague has rejected 
Samsung’s application for an injunction against Apple who has allegedly infringed Samsung’s 
FRAND-pledged SEPs relating to the 3G standard on the basis that Samsung has only made 
one offer and did not respond to Apple’s counter-offers, and that Apple has acted as a willing 
licensee.338 The District Court of The Hague concluded that in this particular case Samsung’s 
request for an injunction “should be considered as abusive and contrary to the principles of 
pre-contractual good faith.”339 In Sony v LG Electronics340 the injunction was denied on the 
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basis of bad faith of the patent owner who sought the injunction without responding to Sony’s 
counteroffer.341  
Unlike in Germany where defendants have to fulfil certain requirements in order to 
successfully rely on the competition law defence, the Dutch courts, when deciding whether it 
is appropriate to grant an injunction, rather assess the parties’ conduct prior to initiation of the 
legal proceedings in order to determine who has acted in good faith.342 The Dutch approach is 
more licensee friendly since it does not require the prospective licensees to come up with their 
own suggestion of FRAND royalties.343   
5.2. The Commission’s approach  
The Commission touched upon the issue of seeking injunctions in standardisation context 
within the review of the merger between Google and Motorola, where it expressed the view 
that the conduct of seeking injunctions in SEPs infringement proceedings may have negative 
effect on both SEP implementers, who may be forced to accept onerous licensing terms, and 
on consumers, where the products implementing the standard are excluded from the 
market.344 On the other hand, the Commission observed that the conduct of seeking an 
injunction is not in itself anti-competitive and that SEP owners may actually legitimately seek 
injunctions against prospective licensees who are not willing to negotiate a FRAND license 
agreement in a good faith.345  
In the very same decision, the Commission accepted that the exceptional 
circumstances test as adopted in Magill and later developed in IMS Health and Microsoft, 
could be applicable to seeking injunctions in disputes over non-SEPs, where a refusal to grant 
access to technology that has become indispensable for competitors can, in specific 
circumstances of the case, amount to an abuse of dominant position under Article 102 
TFEU.346 By distinguishing SEPs as always being necessary in order to obtain access to the 
standard,347 the Commission implicitly suggested that different legal standard might be 
needed.348  
 Nevertheless, by holding that SEP owners can generally seek injunctions in order to 
enforce their IPRs, and that such conduct can only in exceptional circumstances amount to an 
abuse of dominant position,349 the Commission in Samsung Electronics and Motorola 
Mobility extended the exceptional circumstances doctrine which had until then been applied 
within the context of exercise of IPRs to situations concerning protection of IPRs through 
injunctions.350  
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In both cases, the Commission found both Samsung and Motorola’s conduct as 
potentially amounting to an abuse of their dominant positions by seeking and enforcing 
injunctions in the exceptional circumstances of the cases which were deemed to be the 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (“UMTS”) and the GPRS standard setting 
processes within ETSI and Samsung and Motorola’s commitment to license the UMTS351 and 
GPRS352 standards on FRAND terms. Recalling that the exceptional circumstances as set out 
in the previous case law were not exhaustive,353 the Commission introduced two novel 
circumstances.354 It held that patent owners are generally allowed to refuse license, to receive 
appropriate remuneration and to seek remedies for infringements, which is after all within the 
legitimate exercise of their rights. However, in the Commission’s view, the situation is 
different in the standardisation context where the SEP owner issues voluntary commitment to 
give license on FRAND terms and where there is a danger that the benefits of the 
standardisation process would be lost.355 Within that context, the assertion of SEPs constitutes 
an exceptional circumstance, triggering a competition law intervention.  
Moreover, the exceptional circumstance of the standard setting process demonstrates 
that unlike the courts in Germany which treat de jure selected SEPs and de facto standards 
alike, the Commission actually bases its distance from their approach on the difference 
between the two.356 The Commission did not consider the Orange-Book Standard criteria as it 
stated that the ruling in that case “did not specifically relate to SEPs.”357 It is, however, 
questionable whether such basis for the differentiation can hold. Not only have parts of the 
Orange-Book Standard actually been “encompassed by de jure standards,”358 as Lundqvist 
suggests, differentiation should rather be made between standards used in markets 
characterised by network effects (infrastructure markets), which are practically locked once a 
standard has been adopted and where competition law intervention is desirable in order to 
access the market, and those used in markets where network effects are absent and where  
adoption of standards does not rule out existence of competing technology on the market, thus 
maintaining a possibility of competition by substitution.359 
 In the Samsung Electronics decision, the Commission preliminary identified 
Samsung’s conduct of seeking injunctions in various Member States on basis of the UMTS 
technology standard despite its previous commitment to ETSI to license its SEPs on FRAND 
terms as potentially anti-competitive under Article 102 TFEU.360 The Commission concluded 
that, within the exceptional circumstances of the case, such conduct was capable of excluding 
Apple and other implementers of the UMTS standard from the market and of imposing on 
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Apple onerous licensing terms.361 Thus, the Commission identified possibly both exclusionary 
and exploitative abuses. Even though Samsung disagreed with the Commission’s initial 
assessment, in order to meet the concerns expressed by the Commission, it offered 
commitments under article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003 by which it undertook to refrain from 
seeking injunctions against implementers who comply with a certain licensing framework.362 
The licensing framework provides for negotiations period of 12 months and if no licensing 
agreement is reached between the parties at the end of the negotiations period, the dispute 
should be submitted to a court or an arbitrator for a determination of the FRAND licensing 
terms.363 By articulating a procedure which was clearly inspired by the FTC’s Google consent 
order, this part of the decision provides a safe harbour for both parties. If complied with the 
procedure, the SEP implementer will not be faced with injunctions, and the SEP owner will 
not be faced with potential violation of Article 102 TFEU.364 In that regard it is interesting to 
note that the Google consent order was articulated within the boundaries of unfair competition 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act, meaning that if the order was not complied with, the conduct 
of seeking injunctions would be found infringing unfair competition law,365 but not U.S. anti-
trust law,366 whereas in Samsung, the framework was adopted within the context of 
competition law. 
In the Motorola Mobility decision, the Commission found Motorola to be abusing its 
dominant position by seeking an injunction in infringement proceedings concerning patents 
essential to the GPRS standard which it previously committed to license on FRAND terms 
against Apple, a willing licensee, who had agreed to take a license and be bound by a 
determination of a FRAND royalty by the Mannheim District Court (Landgericht 
Mannheim).367 Separate abuse of dominant position was found in Motorola’s conduct of 
requesting Apple to give up its right to challenge the validity or infringement of Motorola’s 
SEPs under a threat of an injunction.368 Even though the obligation was based on contractual 
termination clause, meaning that Motorola could suspend the licensing agreement if Apple 
challenged the validity of Motorola’s GPRS SEP, the Commission stated that its effect was 
the same as if it was a non-challenge369 clause which is generally contrary to the public 
interest370 of ensuring effective competition since SEP implementers and ultimately the 
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consumers should not pay for invalid patents.371  The termination clause was one of those372 
that in the Commission’s view constituted the inclusion of disadvantageous terms which 
Apple would not have accepted under normal course of commercial negotiations without 
Motorola’s recourse to an injunction. The clause had an adverse impact on the level of 
royalties paid by Apple and hindered Apple’s ability to use the challenge of validity as a legal 
defence in order to influence the royalty rate as determined by the Mannheim District 
Court.373 Furthermore, denying Apple the possibility to challenge validity or essentiality of 
the patent infringes Apple’s right of access to courts.374  
The Commission concluded that the decision was not liable to create a reverse hold-up 
problem which could only arise in a situation where there was a danger that Motorola might 
not receive an appropriate remuneration for making its innovative technology available to 
others.375 Such situation did not arise in the specific circumstances of the case since Apple as 
of its second offer was willing to enter into licensing agreement on FRAND terms376 
determined by the Mannheim District Court, on the basis of which Motorola would be 
ensured to receive an appropriate remuneration.377 It is interesting to note that in contrast to 
the finding of the Mannheim District Court, the Commission considered Apple to qualify as a 
willing licensee by its second offer. Since then, Motorola was in the Commission’s view 
abusing its dominant position.378 This example illustrates the difference between the Orange-
Book Standard and the Commission’s approach, where the latter’s criteria of willingness are 
much easier fulfilled by the prospective licensee. 
The Commission acknowledged that injunctions in themselves are not anti-
competitive. Rather, they are used as tools to achieve anti-competitive effects. Recalling the 
judgment in AstraZeneca, it held that “[t]he fact that an act by an autonomous judicial body 
(e.g the granting of an injunction by a court) is a precondition for the likely anti-competitive 
effects resulting from the conduct to materialise cannot affect the abusive nature of the 
conduct.”379 The Commission stated that seeking an injunction was an autonomous act of 
Motorola who was responsible for ensuring that the conduct was compatible with Article 102 
TFEU. It concluded that Motorola’s act of seeking an injunction was capable of having anti-
competitive effects of a temporary ban on the sale of Apple’s GPRS standard-compliant 
products, imposition of disadvantageous licensing terms380 and last, but not least, negative 
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effects on the whole standardisation process.381 The Commission noted that the ban on the 
sale of Apple’s GPRS standard-compliant products could potentially “limit consumer choice 
and partially eliminate downstream competition.”382 The criterion of only partial elimination 
of downstream competition particularly contrasts with the refusal to deal line of case law 
where it is necessary to satisfy a criterion of complete exclusion from the secondary market in 
order for the conduct to amount to an abuse of dominant position. 
 Moreover, the Commission concluded that its approach was fully compatible with the 
requirement of setting a fair balance between the fundamental rights at stake – Motorola’s 
right to IPRs as enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter, Motorola’s and Apple’s right of 
access to courts as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter and the freedom to conduct business 
of Apple and other potential licensees that are not unwilling to take a FRAND license as 
enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter.383 Remarkably, the Commission did not explicitly 
mention freedom to conduct business of Motorola. The Commission has conducted a 
balancing exercise of the rights at issue in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter which 
provides that limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter 
(1) “must be provided by law” and may only be imposed subject to the principle of 
proportionality, where (2) they are “necessary and genuinely meet the objectives of general 
interest recognised by the EU” and (3) “the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.”384 Moreover, the limitations must not constitute “a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights.”385  
 The Commission’s enforcement decision is based on Article 102 TFEU, which 
sufficiently proves that the limitation is provided by law.386 The restriction is imposed in 
accordance with the Union’s objective of establishing an internal market where competition is 
not distorted387 as enshrined in Protocol No 27.388  In that regard, the Commission recalled the 
case law on abuse of dominant position by refusing to license an IPR where a restriction on 
the exclusive right is permitted in accordance with the general interest of maintaining 
effective competition.389  
The Commission further stated that the restriction does not constitute an interference 
which would be infringing upon the very substance of Motorola’s rights. Regarding 
Motorola’s right of access to courts, the Commission held that the decision does not prevent 
Motorola from seeking injunctions on basis of SEPs other than the GPRS standard against 
Apple and other licensees unwilling to enter into a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. 
Moreover, the decision does not prevent Motorola from seeking other remedies provided for 
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by patent law. In that regard, the Commission noted that damages can provide Motorola with 
“a certain level of protection.”390  
Regarding Motorola’s right to IPR, the Commission stated that by voluntary 
committing to license its SEP essential to the GPRS standard on FRAND terms, Motorola 
publicly declared that it does not want to prevent standard-compliant goods from being 
manufactured as long as it receives FRAND remuneration for making its technology available 
to others.391 The rationale of the FRAND commitment is that Apple as a willing licensee can 
legitimately expect that Motorola would fulfil its commitment. By seeking an injunction 
against Apple, Commission’s view is that Motorola breached the commitment.392 It appears 
that the Commission sees FRAND commitment as a SEP owner’s waiver to enforce its right 
of exclusion against willing licensees in exchange for remuneration.393 What is at issue is that 
there is no explicit waiver of injunctive reliefs for FRAND declarations in the rules of any 
major SSO, including ETSI, meaning that there is no legal basis for such theory. The 
assumption adopted by the Commission thus breaches a general principle of law of no implied 
waiver.394 From that perspective, the foundation of the approach appears to be problematic. 
Nevertheless, considering that Motorola’s SEP essential to the GPRS standard relates 
only to a small component of the final mobile device as manufactured by Apple, seeking an 
injunction in such scenario constitutes in the Commission’s view “a disproportionate 
interference” with Apple’s freedom to conduct business,395 in the form of “lawful 
manufacture and sale” of the GPRS-compliant mobile devices. The restriction on Motorola’s 
right to seek an injunction is thus necessary in order to protect the freedom to conduct 
business of Apple and other willing licensees and in order to protect Apple’s right of access to 
courts. All the more so since the potential anti-competitive effect of seeking an injunction in 
the form of ban on selling Apple’s GPRS-compliant mobile devices and contract termination 
in case Apple challenges Motorola’s SEPs’ validity run counter to the objective that 
competition is not distorted to the detriment of public interest.396  
 The Commission dismissed Motorola’s arguments that its conduct could only amount 
to abuse of dominant position under the ITT Promedia and Protégé International line of case 
law. It noted that irrespective of the two judgments, the CJEU has expressly held in IMS 
Health that even an exercise of the exclusive IP rights in order to enforce them by way of 
seeking an injunction can amount to abuse of dominant position. This statement seems to 
confirm the conclusion in regard to the ITT Promedia and Micro Business Leader approaches 
and the distinction between the situations of enforcement of rights through means of litigation 
on one hand and enforcement of IPRs through means of seeking injunctions with the view of 
precluding appearance of the competing products on the market. Moreover, in the 
Commission’s view, the standardisation context and the commitment to license the GPRS 
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SEP on FRAND terms distinguishes the present case from ITT Promedia and Protégé 
International, thus justifying the departure from that case law.397  
In the event the Commission accepted the ITT Promedia exceptional circumstances 
line of case law as the legal standard to use in order to establish abuse of dominant position by 
seeking injunctions, it would have to prove that the request for injunction had no basis in law 
and that it produced anti-competitive effects on the market.398 The Commission, however, 
took a different path. It adopted approach where seeking injunctions within the context of 
FRAND commitment is deemed abusive “as a main rule rather than as an exception.”399 
Thus, even though the Commission framed its assessment within the concept of exceptional 
circumstances, at this point, the approach considerably contrasts with the refusal to deal and 
vexatious litigation lines of case law, where the specific conduct can be found abusive only as 
long as certain “exceptional” requirements are fulfilled.400 The Commission’s approach only 
allows possibility for the SEP owner to escape the competition law violation if he shows that 
his conduct can be objectively justified,401 which generally requires demonstration that either 
the conduct was objectively necessary or that the exclusionary effect produced by it is 
counterbalanced by other efficiency gains to the benefit of consumers.402 In this part of the 
assessment, the Commission considered Apple’s willingness to negotiate on FRAND terms. It 
explained that willingness of the prospective licensees to take a FRAND licensing agreement 
should be assessed when considering objective justification and not when determining 
whether the dominant undertaking’s conduct falls under the prohibition contained in Article 
102 TFEU for the simple reason that abuse is an objective concept. Since the dominant 
undertaking is only responsible for the lawfulness of its own conduct, it would be contrary to 
the general principle of legal certainty to require it to take into consideration factors which are 
not under its control.403    
 Even though the willingness of prospective licensees should be determined on a case 
by case basis, the Commission stipulates that the licensee can demonstrate its willingness for 
instance by agreeing that a court or a mutually agreed arbitrator sets the FRAND royalty rate 
in case of a dispute.404 It appears from the Commission’s statements that it would not consider 
a prospective licensee as unwilling where the licensee challenges the validity, essentiality or 
the infringement of the SEP where it otherwise agrees to be bound by determination of the 
FRAND terms by a third party.405 The interpretation by the German lower courts of the 
Orange-Book-Standard requirement of willing licensee as not being able to challenge the 
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validity of the SEP thus appears to be inconsistent with the Commission’s approach.406 Such 
conclusion is moreover supported by the commitments in Samsung, where it states that the 
prospective licensee cannot be precluded from raising issues of validity and essentiality or 
from challenging the existence of infringement.407 
Although the decisions in Samsung Electronics and Motorola Mobility established a 
safe harbour by setting out the conditions under which a prospective licensee can avoid 
injunctions, it is not entirely clear what happens in cases where the safe harbour does not 
apply since the Commission did not articulate the criteria under which it would determine 
whether the defendant may be considered as willing to negotiate a license in a good faith.408 
As Telyas points up, neither of the decisions addresses the issue of timing of the licensee’s 
request for the license, nor do they explicitly deal with the issue of how the negotiations must 
be initiated, if for instance the prospective licensee must request a license prior to 
infringement,409 two aspects that appear to be crucial in the Huawei v ZTE preliminary 
reference. The Commission’s memo accompanying the two decisions only clarifies the 
situation where prospective licensee is approached by a SEP owner with an offer. In such 
scenario, if the licensee remains unresponsive, he cannot be considered as willing.410 
However, the Commission’s statement does not stipulate an obligation of the licensee to 
proactively seek a license.411 Quite on the contrary, the memo seems to suggest that the SEP 
owner should invite the implementer to negotiate prior to seeking an action for infringement 
even in cases where the implementer has started using the patent before concluding a 
licensing agreement.412 A burden is thus placed on SEP owners to monitor use of their 
patents. This is problematic in a way that SEP implementers could de facto use the patents for 
free until or unless (!) found infringing them and until the SEP owner approaches them with 
an offer to negotiate. In such scenario, there would be no incentive for the implementer to 
actually seek a license.413 Not only thus this approach promotes infringement rather than 
setting a fair balance between the interest of SEP owners and SEP implementers, by shifting it 
in favour of the latter, it also risks eliminating the incentive of patent owners to participate in 
the standardisation process.414 In Telyas’ view, the approach is not aligned with Article 31(b) 
of the TRIPs Agreement which provides that compulsory licenses may only be issued where 
the prospective licensee has already made effort to obtain authorisation to use the patented 
technology from the owner prior to the refusal, on “reasonable commercial terms” and where 
“such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.”415 Moreover, it 
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can be found out from publicly accessible databases, which are generally maintained by 
SSOs, what patents are essential to a specific standard. Thus there is no space for SEP 
implementers to justify not seeking a license.416 
Further criticism of the Commission’s approach has been expressed in regard to being 
based on a scenario of ideal negotiations where the SEP owner and the SEP implementer 
agree on royalties that represent “the underlying value of the patented technology” included in 
the standard.417 The abuse, in the Commission’s view lies with Apple accepting licensing 
terms that it only agreed to under Motorola’s threat of seeking an injunctive relief. The 
Commission’s assessment is thus set against the benchmark of perfect competition418 and 
“normal bargaining considerations in undistorted negotiations.”419 Based on Lemley and 
Shapiro’s assertion that “patents are probabilistic in nature,”420 there is naturally some 
uncertainty about the validity and potential infringement at the starting point in licensing 
negotiations which generally affects the outcome. As illustrated by Larouche, the negotiations 
can basically follow two paths – (1) the parties accept the probabilistic nature of the patent or 
(2) they decide to remove the probabilistic element through court proceedings determining the 
validity of the patent. The Commission views the probabilistic element and the possibility not 
to pay any royalty in case the patent were found invalid as a loss for the implementer. It is 
true that the challenge of validity is a potential option for the SEP implementer to take in 
order to “trigger a move” from path (1) to path (2). However, the Commission does not take 
into consideration the option of SEP owner of seeking injunctive relief as a tool of 
incentivising the implementer to negotiate and to reach an agreement. The Commission by 
preventing Motorola from using the threat of injunctive relief shifts the balance in the 
negotiations process since it takes away the option of the SEP owner while allowing the 
implementer to keep his option.421 Even though this shift might not be beneficial for the 
implementer in the end, as SEP owners may rather be expected to request higher royalty rate 
if following the negotiations path (1) in order to reflect the risk that the SEP is found invalid 
in future, there is some rationale in the Commission’s approach which goes back to its 
reasoning that SEP implementers as well as the final consumers should not pay for invalid 
patents.422 In a way, securing the SEP implementer’s possibility to challenge the validity of 
the patent may be seen as the Commission’s attempt to provide a cure for imperfect patent 
law system which is not “able to ensure thorough quality control.”423 
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5.3. Huawei v ZTE  
In the Huawei v ZTE reference, the Düsseldorf Regional Court has asked the CJEU to clarify 
whether the conduct of seeking injunctions by SEP owners in infringement proceedings and 
its compatibility with competition law should be considered under the requirements of the 
German Orange-Book-Standard case or rather under the more licensee friendly approach 
adopted by the Commission in Motorola Mobility and Samsung Electronics.424 In that regard, 
it has to be pointed up that in light of the Motorola Mobility and Samsung Electronics test, the 
German Orange-Book-Standard appears to be incompatible with the approach taken under 
Article 102 TFEU.425 
Since all five questions rely heavily on the framework of Orange-Book Standard, 
some scholars believe that the decision to seek guidance from CJEU rather than the 
Commission under Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003, which provides national courts with the 
possibility to ask for an opinion concerning the application of the EU competition rules, 
suggests that the Düsseldorf court has made an attempt to steer the debate from the 
Commission’s approach. In Petit’s view, the reference also seems to rule out the General 
Court’s approach to vexatious litigation as indicated in ITT Promedia.426  
The order for reference asks in what circumstances does an action for infringement 
brought by a SEP owner against an implementer of the standard-compliant goods constitute 
an abuse of dominant position. In other words, it seeks to establish the competition law 
framework for SEPs licensing negotiations.427  
The referring court asks whether an abuse of dominant position may result merely 
from the conduct of a SEP owner, who has committed to license on FRAND terms, of seeking 
injunction against a willing licensee or whether the abuse can only be presumed428 where the 
infringer has submitted an appropriate unconditional offer and where it has already acted in 
accordance with the future contractual obligations.429 In that way, the referring court is 
making the CJEU choose between the Commission’s approach and the Orange-Book-
Standard.430 The second and third questions consider both alternatives and ask about the 
conditions that have to be taken into account in order to establish the prospective licensee’s 
willingness.431 The reference implies that the Regional Court of Düsseldorf considers the 
Commission’s standard of establishing good faith as vague and that it is of the view that 
features such as timing and quality of the offers are essential to take into consideration when 
establishing whether the prospective licensee can be viewed as willing or not.432 By the fourth 
question, the referring court asks about the specifics of the offer, should the CJEU prefer the 
Orange-Book-Standard approach. The fifth question asks whether the conditions are the same 
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in relation to remedies other than injunctions.433 Since this issue does not directly fall within 
the scope of the research question, it will not be further dealt with. In any event, the questions 
are framed as considering the willing licensee criterion as an important feature of the 
assessment of potential abuse under Article 102 TFEU, implying that the applicable legal 
standard should allow for a balance to be set between the interests of the SEP owner and the 
SEP implementer.434 
The dispute concerns two Chinese telecommunications undertakings – Huawei, the 
owner of the patent essential to the Long Term Evolution (“LTE”) standard, who committed 
to ETSI to license the patent on FRAND terms, and ZTE, a manufacturer of the standard-
compliant products. Between November 2010 and March 2011, the two undertakings engaged 
in discussions about infringement of the patent, and later in negotiations concerning possible 
licensing agreement. During those negotiations, Huawei suggested an amount which it 
considered as a FRAND offer, ZTE, on the other hand, sought a cross-licensing agreement 
and proposed a royalty payment of EUR 50. In that regard, ZTE declared itself to be a willing 
licensee.435 Nevertheless, as the referring court observed, the parties did not exchange any 
specific offers.436 In April 2011, Huawei brought an action for infringement after “the 
breakdown of the negotiations” before the referring court, where it, among others, seeks 
injunctions and damages. ZTE opposes the action by claiming that Huawei abused its 
dominant position.437 In order to paint the whole picture, it has to be pointed up that during 
the course of the negotiations ZTE challenged the validity of the patent before the European 
Patent Office, which in January 2013 confirmed its validity.438 An appeal is currently 
pending.439 
Even though the referring court observes that there was no basis in law for ZTE to 
implement the SEP at issue without concluding a licensing agreement, on the other hand, it 
takes the view that the action for injunction sought by Huawei could be dismissed on basis of 
Huawei possibly abusing its dominant440 position under article 102 TFEU. In that regard, the 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf states that there are two possibly conflicting approaches 
determining whether the SEP owner’s conduct of seeking an injunction is compatible with 
competition law.441  
Regarding the Orange-Book-Standard requirements, the referring court observed that 
neither of the two conditions were fulfilled in this particular case on grounds that ZTE offers 
were not unconditional within the meaning of the case law of the German courts and that 
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irrespective of the correctness of the determination of the FRAND royalty by ZTE, the royalty 
was not paid.442 On the other hand, the referring court was of the view that under the 
Commission’s approach as stipulated in its press release, the action for injunction brought by 
Huawei would have to be dismissed as an abuse of dominant position since Huawei 
committed to ETSI to license its LTE standard essential patent on FRAND terms and ZTE’s 
written offers satisfied the criterion of willing licensee within the Commission’s interpretation 
of the term.443 
5.3.1. Opinion of AG Wathelet 
Although the AG initially dismissed the Orange-Book-Standard approach, in a similar way as 
the Commission, due to “significant factual differences”444 as it was adopted within the 
context of a de facto standard with no FRAND commitment issued,445 he claims to try to find 
a “middle path”446 between the Orange-Book-Standard approach and the approach indicated 
in Samsung. Since he considered the Commission’s approach as vague, especially in regards 
to determining the infringer’s willingness to negotiate, thus not being precise enough to 
justify limitation on the SEP owner’s right to seek an injunction, the AG stated that neither the 
Orange-Book-Standard, nor the Commission’s approach is appropriate. The former would 
result in over-protection and the latter into under-protection of the SEP owner.447 
Same as the Commission, the approach suggested by the AG is based on an 
assumption that SEP owner’s conduct of seeking an injunction against a prospective licensee 
who is willing to take a license on FRAND terms constitutes abuse of dominant position 
under Article 102 TFEU. Although the AG states that a fair balance between the different 
rights at stake must be set,448 the opinion barely touches upon the right of access to courts and 
considers only Huawei’s right to the IPR and ZTE’s freedom to conduct business.  
The AG starts his assessment by defining the right to bring an action for injunction as being 
directly linked to the IPR. Since property rights are not absolute, a restriction can be placed 
upon them either by law or the IPR owner can limit the exercise of his right by himself. The 
former occurs where the IPR collides with rules of general interest. In this particular case, the 
IPR has to be “reconciled” with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU which serve to ensure that 
competition is not distorted. Referring to Article 12 of the Enforcement Directive, the AG 
moreover states that the Directive “envisaged” that the right to seek an injunction may in 
certain circumstances be substituted by a right to obtain monetary compensation. However, it 
is disputable to what extent would those circumstances – the infringer has acted 
unintentionally and without negligence, the injunction would cause disproportionate harm and 
monetary compensation would be adequate – be fulfilled in the present case, especially in 
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regard to the intention or negligence of the infringement, given that publicly accessible 
databases of SEPs are generally maintained by SSOs. In any event, the AG views the scenario 
of the present case as the latter situation, where the SEP owner limits the exercise of his 
exclusive right himself, by issuing a FRAND commitment.449  
Huawei’s commitment to ETSI to license its patent to third parties is also what 
distinguishes the dispute at hand from the previous case law on refusal to deal. Here, the 
centre of the issue is whether the FRAND commitment is complied with. In the AG’s view, 
Huawei’s commitment should be construed as meaning that it is in principle willing to license 
to third parties and that it accepts that FRAND royalty constitutes an adequate compensation. 
Thus, Huawei’s conduct cannot be equated to refusal to deal within the meaning of the 
CJEU’s case law, which should be applicable only partially, depending on the fulfilment of 
the commitment.450 However, the AG’s construction of FRAND commitment as leading to 
licenses of right451 appears to be at odds with the typical wording of a FRAND commitment 
which rather suggests that SEP owners declare that they are prepared to grant licences, not 
that they will grant licenses.452 In any event, under such construction of FRAND commitment, 
a comparison can be drawn to TeliaSonera,453 where by applying the margin squeeze doctrine, 
the dominant undertaking was punished for “having tried to entertain commercial 
relationships with its competitors by facing a lower threshold for a finding of abuse than if it 
had done nothing at all.”454 Similarly as TeliaSonera, where the telecommunications 
undertaking was under no obligation to provide access to its network,455 in this case, Huawei 
did not have to enter into the standardisation process and to issue a FRAND commitment, in 
which case it would have been under no obligation to license.  
Taking an inspiration from the CJEU’s judgment in Volvo456 and using analogical 
reasoning, the AG identifies the possible abuse in the IP owner’s conduct of exploiting a 
position which he has gained on the market by creating a relationship of dependence between 
himself and IP implementers through recourse to methods other than those governing normal 
competition.457 The AG observes that in the circumstances of the standardisation process 
which leads to “technological dependence”, the FRAND commitment, and where the 
prospective licensee is objectively willing to conclude a FRAND agreement, an action for 
injunction constitutes recourse to methods other than those governing normal competition. 
Since such conduct has adverse effects on both the consumers and SEP implementers who 
“have invested in the preparation, adoption and application of the standard,” it must be seen 
as constituting an abuse of dominant position.458 By framing the approach under Volvo, the 
AG has avoided the controversy of introducing novel “exceptional” circumstances, like the 
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Commission did in Motorola. However, what is striking is that the wording, suggests that the 
AG is arguing for a per se abuse of dominant position. To put it differently, the AG considers 
the mere conduct of a SEP owner of seeking an injunction to amount to an abuse, without 
actually requiring a demonstration of anti-competitive effects.459 This approach is contrary to 
the Commission’s statement in Google/Motorola and Motorola where it explicitly recognised 
that injunctions in themselves cannot be anti-competitive.460  
The AG acknowledges that the conduct of seeking an injunction cannot constitute an 
abuse of dominant position where the SEP implementer behaves in tactical and dilatory 
way.461 Holding that a SEP implementer who reserves the right to challenge the validity or 
essentiality of the patent cannot be regarded as dilatory,462 the opinion provides for safe 
harbour fairly identical to the one articulated by the Commission. The AG bases his reasoning 
on grounds that given the high amount of 4 700 patents which have been notified as essential 
to the LTE standard, the SEP implementer is not able to verify the validity and essentiality of 
the patent.463 However, an emphasis should perhaps not be put on whether it was possible for 
the SEP implementer to know that a certain patent was valid or essential, after all that is for 
patent offices to check, where the implementer should have known from a publicly accessible 
databases that the patent was declared as essential. 
The AG suggests that before bringing the action for injunction, the SEP owner must, 
pursuant to the special responsibility that it has and pursuant to the FRAND commitment, take 
“certain specific steps,” which should consist of the following. The SEP owner must alert the 
implementer in writing that it has been infringing a SEP. In the AG’s view, such requirement 
is not disproportionate considering that the SEP owner would in any event have to take the 
same step “in order to substantiate” an action for injunction. Subsequently, the SEP owner 
should present the implementer a written offer for a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. 
Neither this step is in the AG’s view disproportionate as the SEP owner has already restricted 
the exercise of its exclusive right by giving the voluntary FRAND commitment. The AG 
moreover holds that “it is reasonable to expect” that the SEP owner drafts his offer upon 
obtaining the patent and giving his commitment to license on FRAND terms to a SSO. If the 
SEP implementer does not accept the offer, it must submit, in writing, a counter-offer.464 It is 
perhaps surprising that the AG does not set a time frame for the licensing negotiations. Unlike 
the Commission which in Samsung considered the 12 months period to be appropriate,465 the 
AG merely states that the timeframe of the negotiations must be assessed “in light of the 
commercial window of opportunity available to the SEP-holder for securing a return on its 
patent.”466 In any event, the AG concludes that it is for the referring court to assess whether 
Huawei’s offer and ZTE’s response, complied with these guidelines.467 
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While formulating the steps that the SEP owner needs to take in order to escape 
Article 102 TFEU violation, the AG, similarly as the Commission, seems to disregard some 
important features of standardisation. The opinion does not acknowledge that the SEP 
owner’s behaviour follows the rationale of standardisation which is to ensure as wide 
implementation of the standard as possible.468 Moreover, it does not reflect the fact that in 
order to avoid litigation costs, licensing negotiations “without verifying the validity or 
essentiality of every SEP” might very well be in the interest of both the SEP owner and the 
SEP implementer.469  
The AG holds that had the SSOs established rules of conduct for negotiations of 
FRAND licensing agreements, disputes could have been avoided. The current situation only 
encourages SEP owners to use injunctions as leverage in negotiations.470 Such observation 
seems to suggest that the AG’s view is much like the Commission’s based on an assumption 
of perfect competition and it does not take into account that it is not only SEP owners who 
possess certain tools that they can use as leverage in negotiations. As mentioned above, SEP 
implementers’ threat of challenging validity or essentiality of the patent is a powerful tool to 
use as leverage in negotiations much the same as the SEP owner’s threat of an injunctive 
relief. This discussion was possibly not lost on the Regional Court in Düsseldorf which in its 
order for reference observed that a restriction of the SEP owner’s right to bring an action for 
injunction would deprive him of significant leverage to use in the negotiations and would 
distort an equal position of the parties in the negotiations process.471  
The AG in his own words tries to find a middle path between the approach stipulated 
by the Orange-Book-Standard case and the Commission’s approach in Samsung and 
Motorola. The AG is right in stating that the Orange-Book-Standard approach results in over-
protection of the SEP owner and that the Commission’s approach, on the other hand, results in 
under-protection. Nevertheless, despite the laudable aim, he does not find the middle path. By 
imposing obligations on SEP owners to proactively monitor their existing SEPs, the AG’s 
approach shifts the balance even further away from setting a fair protection. To put it 
differently, had the approach been adopted by the CJEU, it would have an even more adverse 
impact on the protection of the SEP owner’s rights. By requiring a SEP owner to present a 
specific written offer to the implementer, it goes even a step further than the Commission’s 
approach which merely required the SEP owner to invite the implementer to negotiate.472 The 
AG is right in stating that the Commission’s approach is vague. However, the approach that 
he indicates that certain specific steps need to be satisfied in order for the SEP owner to 
escape violation of Article 102 TFEU does not allow for balancing of interests. It is clear from 
the opinion that in the specific circumstances of the case, the SEP implementer’s freedom to 
conduct business trumps the SEP owner’s right to property.473  
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5.3.2. Judgment of the Court 
At first reading, the judgment appears to adopt approach similar to the one suggested by the 
AG. Both of them articulate, to certain extent, analogous procedural conditions that the SEP 
owner has to satisfy in order to escape violation of Article 102 TFEU by seeking injunctions 
in SEPs infringement proceedings. In several paragraphs of the judgment, the CJEU even 
makes references to the opinion. However, at closer look, there are certain distinctions in the 
CJEU’s judgment,474 relating to different theoretical considerations which the Court uses as a 
basis for its assessment. 
 Despite the referring court’s detailed formulation of the questions, the CJEU has 
answered them jointly, stating that they essentially ask the same – i.e. under what 
circumstances the initiation of legal proceedings with the view of obtaining the recall of 
products475 by a SEP owner who has given undertaking to a SSO to license on FRAND terms 
can amount to an abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.476 
 Even though Article 102 TFEU only condemns abuse of dominant position, not 
dominance as such, the CJEU has stayed clear of the discussion on a major issue of 
establishing dominant position of SEPs’ owners by holding that it is apparent from the order 
for reference that Huawei’s dominant position has not been disputed in the proceedings before 
the national court.477  
 The Court begun its assessment by stating that the lawfulness of the action for 
infringement has to be viewed within the context of a balance being established between the 
general interest of maintaining an undistorted competition, which is secured among others by 
Article 102 TFEU, and the rights of the SEP owner, in particular the right to IPRs pursuant to 
Article 17(2) of the Charter and the right of effective judicial protection under Article 47 of 
the Charter.478 Thus, already the starting point of the assessment distinguishes the Court’s 
approach from the one suggested by the Commission and the AG. The Court does not even 
make a single reference to the implementer’s freedom to conduct business, unlike the 
Commission and the AG who justify the encroachment on the SEP owner’s right to IPRs 
precisely on grounds of the implementer’s freedom to conduct business. The Court on the 
other hand follows the framework of its settled case law which is based on an abuse as an 
objective concept. Therefore, the assessment focuses strictly on the conduct of the dominant 
undertaking.479  
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  Referring to its established case law, the Court continued that the exercise of an 
exclusive right to bring an action for infringement which is directly linked to the owner’s IPR 
can only amount to an abuse under exceptional circumstances.480 This wording of action for 
infringement directly flowing from the exclusive rights conferred on IP owners, not from the 
right of access to courts, together with the omission of any reference to ITT Promedia/Protégé 
International seems to confirm the earlier implications relating to the judgment in Micro 
Business Leader. The CJEU does not consider the use of injunctions by SEP owners to 
amount to abusive litigation, but it rather focuses on the exclusionary effects that the use of 
injunctions can produce on the product market.  
The Court agreed with the AG that the circumstances of the case at hand are, however, 
different to the ones that gave rise to the Magill/IMS Health line of case law on refusal to 
deal. It identified the “different” circumstances of the case as (1) the indispensability of the 
patent and (2) the fact that the status of a SEP was only obtained in return for a FRAND 
commitment.481 Even though the requirement of indispensability is also one of the conditions 
which needs to be satisfied in order for a refusal to deal to amount to an abuse of dominant 
position, here the Court presumes that use of the patent essential to a standard is indispensable 
for all implementers, since unlike in the case of non-essential patents it is not possible for 
competitors to manufacture competing products. It is arguable whether this presumption is 
correct in relation to all SEPs. Considering the debate on the appropriateness of distinctions 
being made between de facto and de iure standards which was articulated above, it should 
perhaps be narrowed down to SEPs in network dependent industries. In any event, the Court’s 
conclusion is that the SEP status of the patent leads into the possibility for SEP owners to 
block their competitors’ products from appearing on the market.482 In other words, the anti-
competitive concern identified by the Court is that the SEP status of the patent brings along 
foreclosure risks on secondary markets. Thus it appears from the wording that the Court’s 
reasoning only relates to vertically integrated undertakings, i.e. undertakings who are both 
owners of network protocol SEPs and manufacturers of mobile telephone devices. By refusing 
to license their network protocol SEPs to other mobile telephone manufactures, these 
undertakings are then able to foreclose the entire product market.483 Such conclusion would 
mean that non-practising entities would be outside the scope of Article 102 TFEU. The Court, 
however, did not touch upon the issue of exploitative abuses.  
Moreover, it should be pointed up that by crafting the legal test within the framework 
of exclusionary abuses conducted by vertically integrated dominant undertakings the Court 
has completely avoided the debate on the existence of patent hold-up, in fact the term is not 
mentioned in the judgment even a single time. Thus, by focusing solely on the exclusionary 
effect of the use of injunctions in SEPs infringement proceedings by vertically-integrated 
undertakings, which calls for competition law solution, the CJEU’s approach can also be 
clearly distinguished from the U.S. doctrine, which is framed precisely within the context of 
the patent hold-up phenomenon, which in turn calls for a solution to be found in patent law. 
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In the Court’s view, given the circumstances identified above and given that the 
FRAND commitment creates legitimate expectations on the part of SEP implementers that 
SEP owners will grant licenses on those terms, a refusal to do so “may, in principle, constitute 
an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.”484 Not only does FRAND lack a precise 
meaning which makes the concept of legitimate expectations on the basis of the commitment 
contradictory to the Court’s previous case law485 where it held in the Microsoft 2012 case that 
the term reasonable encompasses a range of rates,486 which leads to a conclusion that it does 
not have a sufficiently precise meaning in order to create a legitimate expectation. Similarly 
as the AG’s construction of FRAND commitment leading to a license of right, the concept of 
legitimate expectations appears problematic considering the usual formulation of FRAND 
declarations. Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the judgment in Huawei v ZTE with the 
Commission’s approach in Motorola, where the wording suggests that only willing licensees 
can legitimately expect that SEP owners will honour their FRAND commitment.487 The 
Court, on the other hand, holds that “FRAND terms create legitimate expectations on the part 
of third parties,”488 without considering their willingness to take a license.  
Here again, a comparison may be made to the case law on margin squeeze abuse 
where the CJEU has held that despite there being no competition law obligation to deal, 
where the dominant undertaking voluntarily decides to do so, it has to “supply on terms at 
which it at least could compete.”489 Coates illustrates the doctrine490 on the scenarios in 
IPCom, Samsung and Motorola, holding that these undertakings were under no obligation “to 
enter into the standardisation process,” yet, since they voluntarily decided to do so, they have 
to comply with the FRAND commitment. Just like in TeliaSonera, the surprising implication 
of the approach is that if the said undertakings did not enter into the standardisation process 
they would have been “allowed” to refuse to license on FRAND terms or at all.491 In that 
regard, the Court’s approach thus appears to undermine the goal of promoting standardisation 
and innovation.    
It follows from the Court’s approach that the SEP owner’s abusive refusal can be 
raised as a defence in infringement proceedings. The Court, however, added that SEP owners 
are only obliged to grant licenses on FRAND terms.492 Since it is disputed what constitutes 
those terms and in order to avoid the conduct of seeking an injunction and the recall of 
products from being found abusive, the Court stated, similarly as the Commission and the 
AG, that the SEP owner has to comply with certain requirements in order “to ensure a fair 
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balance between the interests concerned.”493 The Court goes on stating that the high level of 
protection of IPRs which is guaranteed by the Enforcement Directive, which in that regard, in 
accordance with Article 17(2) of the Charter provides for various legal remedies, and Article 
47 of the Charter which inter alia covers the right of access to courts, means that SEP owners 
may not generally be deprived of their right to initiate legal proceedings.494 Even the FRAND 
commitment given by SEP owners cannot, in the Court’s words, “negate the substance of 
[those] rights.”495 However, it apparently justifies imposition of specific requirements on the 
SEP owner when bringing an action for injunction or for the recall of products.496 Thus, the 
CJEU does not shape its approach as an exceptional circumstance within the General Court’s 
ITT Promedia line of case law, but rather imposes limits on the SEP owner’s right to effective 
judicial protection.497 
  The Court stated that in order to escape violation of Article 102 TFEU, SEP owners 
have to notify the alleged infringers, specifying the SEP and the way in which it has been 
infringed. The SEP owner is obliged to alert or consult the infringer irrespective of whether 
the infringer has already been using the SEP in question or not. The Court justifies this 
obligation in the same way as the AG by holding that given the numerous patents that are 
essential to one standard, SEP implementers might not even know that they may be using 
teaching of a SEP. This argument, however, appears to be tenuous given that SSOs actually 
maintain publicly accessible databases of patents that are essential to a specific standard.  
After the alleged infringer expresses willingness to take a license on FRAND terms, 
the Court does not, however, explain how that is to be done, it is up to the SEP owner to 
present to the infringer a specific written offer. Here, the Court’s approach differentiates from 
the one taken by the AG in whose opinion the SEP owner has to present a specific written 
offer even without the infringer expressing his willingness.498 Nevertheless, the Court 
continued that it is for the SEP owner to specify the royalty that is to be paid with an 
explanation of how it has been calculated. In the Court’s view that is the only reasonable step 
since the SEP owner is in any event expected to comply with its FRAND commitment and it 
is the owner of the patent who is better placed to determine the appropriate amount of royalty, 
knowing the terms of the licenses that he has concluded with other competitors and being 
guided by the principle of non-discrimination.499  
In the next step, it is for the alleged infringer to “diligently […] respond to that offer, 
in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, a point 
which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, 
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that there are no delaying tactics.”500 Unfortunately, the Court does not exemplify what those 
recognised commercial practises and objective factors might be and how should the national 
courts determine whether the SEP implementer’s behaviour may be characterised as a 
delaying tactic. 
If the alleged infringer does not accept an offer made by the SEP owner in accordance 
with the abovementioned requirements, in order to successfully rely on the competition law 
defence, he has to present a specific written counter-offer which complies with FRAND 
terms.501 In that regard, it is not clear from the judgment how FRAND terms are to be 
determined from the point of view of the alleged infringer. The Court only specifies that 
where the infringer has already been using the patent prior to concluding a licensing 
agreement and if the counter-offer has been rejected, the infringer has to render an account of 
the past acts of use and has to provide the SEP owner with an “appropriate security, in 
accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field.”502 Here, the approach differs 
again to the AG who suggested that security should only be required where the infringer has 
asked for court determination of FRAND terms.503 
Even though comparing to the Commission’s balancing exercise, the CJEU has only 
considered the first two steps, it did not examine the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others when imposing a restriction on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter, 
the judgment seems to set a more appropriate balance between the interests of the parties. For 
instance, it improves the SEP owners’ position to what was suggested by the Commission and 
the AG. Although the procedural requirements seem to be drafted in similar way as those 
designed by the Commission in Samsung and by the AG in his opinion, a significant 
difference is that the Court’s assessment framework creates a safe harbour for the dominant 
undertakings, not for SEP implementers as the Commission stipulated. Further distinctions 
can be found in the subsequent paragraphs. 
In the event an agreement on FRAND terms is not reached after the infringer has 
presented his counter-offer, a third party determination of an appropriate royalty may be 
requested by the parties.504 The wording of the judgment suggests that unlike in the 
Commission’s and AG’s approach, third party determination of FRAND royalty should rather 
be voluntary step to take for the parties. The Court has thus removed the SEP implementers’ 
safe harbour created by the Commission and the AG that an injunction cannot be issued 
against them as long as they agreed to third party determination of FRAND terms.505  
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Regarding the SEP implementer’s possible challenge of validity or essentiality of the 
patent, the Court held, considering that SSOs do not check validity or essentiality of patents 
and given the SEP implementer’s right of effective judicial protection pursuant to Article 47 
of the Charter, that such conduct “cannot be criticised.”506 The language is not as strong as 
the one used by the Commission and the AG, however, it is apparent that it renders the 
interpretation of Orange-Book Standard by German lower courts incompatible with EU law.  
It can be concluded that despite the referring court’s emphasis on the willing licensee 
criterion as being of great importance for the assessment of abuse, it did not play a major role 
in the CJEU’s judgment. The Court did not let itself to be dragged into a discussion on the 
patent hold-up controversy. It stayed within the boundaries of its established case law on 
exclusionary conducts of dominant, vertically-integrated undertakings. Rather than assessing 
the conduct of seeking injunctions under the exceptional circumstances doctrine, it focused on 
legitimate expectations of third parties that SEP owners will honour their FRAND 
commitment. For the conduct of seeking injunctions not to fall under the prohibition 
contained in Article 102 TFEU, the CJEU stipulated number of procedural requirements that 
need to be satisfied. In that way, the Court followed the formalistic tone of the approaches 
crafted by the Commission and the AG. 
Although the judgment was highly anticipated by both legal practitioners and scholars 
across Europe, it is arguable whether it has lived up to those expectations. Since the judgment 
left number of issues open, it is highly probable that rather than putting an end, it will merely 
become a chapter in the debate on the use of injunctions within the context of SEPs and EU 
competition law.   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
506 CJEU judgment in Huawei v ZTE, para. 69 
62 
 
6. Conclusion  
Since injunctions are by origin equitable remedies, it seemed reasonable to expect that the 
parties’ good faith507 would play an important role in the assessment on whether granting of 
an injunction would be appropriate in the particular case.508 When determining whether 
seeking injunctions amounts to an abuse of dominant position, it was thus expected that courts 
would balance the interests of the parties in the specific circumstances of the case.509 This was 
done for instance by courts in the Netherlands. Even though such approach may threaten the 
objective of uniform interpretation of the EU law, which is contrary to the principle of legal 
certainty, the flexibility would allow for a proportionate balancing of interests within the 
meaning of the Scarlet Extended case.510 In the approaches of the national courts, the 
Commission and the AG, the criterion of willingness of the prospective licensee plays an 
important role in that regard. 
The German Orange-Book-Standard framework with its patentee-friendly formalistic 
criteria already appeared to be inconsistent with Article 102 TFEU as interpreted in the 
Commission’s decisions in Samsung and Motorola. The interpretation of willingness of the 
prospective licensee by the lower German courts which consider the licensee to be willing as 
long as it gives up the right to challenge the validity of the patent contravenes the licensee’s 
right of access to courts. The conclusion is implicitly confirmed in the CJEU’s judgment in 
Huawei v ZTE, although the Court used much lighter words than the Commission.  
Unlike the Orange-Book-Standard which stipulates that the action of seeking an 
injunction violates competition law only where certain requirements are fulfilled, the 
Commission considered the action of seeking an injunction to be an abuse of dominant 
position in the exceptional circumstances of the cases, with the possibility for the SEP owner 
to offer an objective justification. It appears from the Commission’s wording that such 
justification would only be acceptable in case of unwilling licensees. As Larouche points up, 
“[t]he starting presumption in Orange Book is ‘injunctive relief is available unless…’, 
whereas in Motorola and Samsung it is ‘injunctive relief is an abuse of dominant position 
unless…’”511  Unlike in the Orange-Book-Standard where the courts placed the burden on the 
SEP implementer to behave in a certain way in order to be able to successfully raise the 
competition law defence, in Samsung and Motorola, it is the SEP owner who has to satisfy 
certain requirements in order to escape violation of Article 102 TFEU. This further relates to 
the differences in the use of the criterion of willing licensee. Under the Orange-Book-
Standard, the criterion of willing licensee is raised by SEP implementers as a procedural 
defence against the imposition of injunctions, whereas under the Commission’s approach, 
                                                 
507 In that regard, see Larouche, op. cit., p. 6, where he considers the criterions of good faith or proportionality as 
fulfilling similar function as equitable remedies in the common law system. 
508 Lim, op. cit., p. 64 
509 Jones, op. cit., p. 25 
510 Telyas, op. cit., p. 214 
511 Larouche, op. cit., p. 31 
63 
 
(un)willingness of the prospective licensees can be raised as an objective justification for 
seeking injunctions, which would otherwise be found abusive.512  
The Commission framed its approach within the exceptional circumstances line of 
case law, which conforms to the principle that the right to IPRs and the right of access to 
courts can only be encroached upon in exceptional circumstances as established in Magill and 
ITT Promedia. However, the Commission introduced completely novel circumstances under 
which an owner of a SEP can be found abusing its dominant position by seeking an injunction 
– the standard setting process and the FRAND commitment issued by the SEP owner. The 
problem is that there is nothing exceptional about the circumstances of the standard setting 
process and FRAND commitments. The Commission’s approach basically places all 
undertakings operating in the ICT industry under a threat of finding themselves in exceptional 
circumstances, which in words of Bo Vesterdorf, the former President of the General Court, is 
“somewhat bizarre.”513 The Commission’s approach is especially “dangerous” given that the 
Commission considers seeking an injunction as an abuse unless there is an objective 
justification for the SEP owner’s conduct. In that regard it would appear as appropriate to 
interpret the notion of objective justification rather broadly, yet the opposite is true as follows 
from the Commission’s case law on the interpretation of the criterion of willingness.  
Even less balanced approach in weighting the interests of the parties in the 
negotiations process was presented by the AG in his opinion in Huawei v ZTE, where he 
placed a considerable burden on SEP owners to monitor use of their SEPs. Moreover, 
considering that the AG’s approach appears to condemn injunctions in the FRAND context as 
such, without considering anti-competitive effects, this approach seems even less appropriate.  
Within the discussion on standardisation and the hold-up problem, seeking injunctions 
should not be seen as a refusal to license since such conduct is not aimed at reserving the 
product market for the SEP owner. After all, doing so would contravene the rationale of 
standardisation.514 Since SEP owners commit to grant licenses under FRAND terms, 
injunctions are rather used as bargaining mechanisms in the negotiations procedure, where 
they serve to balance the incentives of both the SEP owner and the prospective licensee, or in 
other words, balance between the potential opportunistic behaviour of both which could result 
either in hold-up or hold-out.515 Injunctions are thus used in a similar way as implementers 
use challenges to validity of SEPs in order to gain leverage in licensing negotiations. Even 
though the Commission and the AG disregarded the balance between the parties’ possibility 
to use the respective tools of injunctions and challenges to validity, they both distinguished 
their approaches from the classical refusal to deal case law.  
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The CJEU’s judgment is, however, based on different considerations. Despite certain 
similarities and references to the AG’s opinion, the Court distanced itself from the discussion 
on the existence of hold-up problem within the standard setting context. Instead, it assessed 
Huawei’s conduct of seeking injunction as a conduct of vertically-integrated undertaking, 
dominant on the upstream technology market which may potentially leverage its position into 
the secondary product market with the effect of excluding their competitors’ products. In 
other words, the Court subsumed the current scenario under its line of case law on 
exclusionary abuses conducted by vertically-integrated dominant undertakings where the anti-
competitive concern is that the dominant undertaking’s conduct brings along foreclosure risks 
on secondary markets. Although the Court bases its approach on legitimate expectations of 
SEP implementers that SEP owners will fulfil their FRAND promise, it has the same 
implications as the exceptional circumstances line of case law since the circumstances of 
indispensability of the patent obtained in return for the FRAND commitment lead to a refusal 
to license on FRAND terms amounting to an abuse of dominant position.516 Nevertheless, an 
assessment relying on legitimate expectations which are based on FRAND undertaking seems 
a bit controversial since there is no common agreement between the Member States on the 
nature and meaning of that commitment. The Court did not add anything in that regard, 
leaving it to national courts to assess whether certain terms might be considered FRAND or 
not. Not only does this approach lead to national courts turning into pricing authorities,517 the 
absence of any guidance on the determination of FRAND will probably result in new 
preliminary references. 
The Court’s stance towards the FRAND concept might also seem surprising since it 
avoided discussion on another phenomenon in regard to which there is no consensus between 
legal practitioners and scholars and that is the existence of patent hold-up. However, it might 
not necessarily end the debate in Europe since the judgment seems to be narrowed down to 
the particular circumstances of the case of an exclusionary abuse of a vertically-integrated 
undertaking.  
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